"As for the enemies of freedom, those who are potential adversaries, they will be reminded that peace is the highest aspiration of the American people. We will negotiate for it, sacrifice for it; we will not surrender for it, now or ever." - Reagan, January 20, 1981

"In Vietnam, we tried and failed in a just cause. No More Vietnams can mean we will not try again. It should mean we will not fail again." - from No More Vietnams by Richard Nixon

Tuesday, November 23, 2010

The real story of Iran 1953

From "The Persian Night" by Amir Taheri

click images to enlarge [And please see my earlier post addressing this topic]

Sunday, November 7, 2010

Jerry Rubin confesses on behalf of the 1968 Left

1976 was the watershed year in the historiography of the Chicago conspiracy and and "Yippies" - and I am surprised history choose to ignore the information Jerry Rubin provided that year.

The Information was provided in two separate ways. The first was an article he wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times about he and his fellow "Chicago 7" conspirators, saying in part:

"Let's face it. We WANTED disruption. We PLANNED it. We were NOT innocent victims. We worked on our plans for over a year before we came here. We made our demands on the city so outrageous because we wanted the city to deny us what we were asking. We did all of this with one purpose in mind - to make the city react as if it was a police state, and to focus the attention of the world on us. The prosecution, all during the trial, said we were guilty. And you know what? We were. Guilty as hell! Guilty as charged! … Chicago's officials and Chicago's police reacted just as we knew they would ... Chicago snapped at our bait...”

The second was in the form of a book, "Growing (Up) At 37", saying:

“The next act in growing antiwar consciousness would be to steal the media in Chicago during the week of the 1968 Democratic Convention. We sent the call out to kids all over the country to come to Chicago for a party. It would be our Festival of life against the Convention of Death.

To carry this out we needed a new organization. The stuffy political organizations were too cumbersome to make decisions, too straight to understand media theater. On New Year’s Eve, 1967, seven of us got together in Abbie’s apartment on

St. Marks Place
. We studied the problem in a stoned way. It was a youth revolution, an international revolution, and we wanted to have a party. That became Y.I.P., Youth International Party, and Paul Krassner shouted “Yippie!” and we ran around the room dancing. We had it!

A myth is an idea that exists in people’s heads. As long as the myth exists, it makes no difference whether or not the physical reality exist. If people act on the myth, they will create the reality. The media creates myths; then the reality catches up to the myth and gives it flesh. Yippie was a myth created in our heads that became reality.

Yet “yippies” sounds so frivolous – would people actually call themselves “yippies”? Can you imagine the President warning the country about the danger from the “yippies”? Nobody would take him seriously, and the whole country would be reduced to one big joke. Ed Sanders added the slogan, “Aban-the creeping meatball!” and we were on the bandwagon – yippies were come coming to Chicago.

When Chicago came only five thousand people showed up, LBJ had been forced out of the Presidency by antiwar pressure. Bobby Kennedy was dead. No major rock groups came to Chicago. And Abbie and I were not speaking to each other; we had separated off into yippie factions. We were a conspirators no longer talked to each other! The Chicago police went berserk in the streets, turning newsmen into yippies with their billy clubs. I was kidnapped off the streets by five cops on the last night. My bodyguard for the week, a biker named Bob, turned out to be a Chicago policeman, and his testimony eventually sent me to jail for two months. … The Democratic Party never recovered from Chicago, and Nixon was elected. Six months after taking office, he approved the indictment of eitht radicals for conspiring to riot in Chicago.

I am speaking now only for myself, writing what I could never write during the trial or while our appeals were being considered.

During the five-and-a-half month trail I agreed more with the government’s analysis of our behavior than with our defense. The government held us responsible for what happened in Chicago. Our defense saw us primarily as victims.

The government said: these men are radicals who wanted a disturbance in Chicago to disrupt American society and protest the war. Our defense was that we were citizens whose civil liberties were violated by the government’s police riot against us. The government was right in theory, but wrong in specifics. Despite the most exhaustive FBI hunt for information since the Kennedy assassination, they had all the facts wrong. Throughout my activist life I was always amazed by the FBI’s stupidity. They never knew what was going on.

I ask myself how I became an aemchair guerrilla. I say “armchair” because I never shot a gun or bomb, but I supported the Vietcong and selective violence here at home. Though I am a white middle-class American, who enjoys a good meal and the luxury of comfort, I nevertheless share the feeling of extremist revolutionaries.”

Is this not relevant and important information? Why is it ignored?

Wednesday, October 20, 2010

Before the story disappears again - Patriot Max Friedman who infiltrated 60s/70s "peace" movements

From the website To Set the Record Straight: an Interview with Max Friedman

Interview with Max Friedman

ZIEGLER: This is the Inquisition with Scott Swett and Tim Ziegler on RighTalk Radio on Independence Day 2005: 230 years of freedom.

We're interviewing today Mr. Max Friedman. Scott, you have known Mr. Friedman for a number of years. Can you give us some background and introduce Mr. Friedman to our guests.

SWETT: Well, I wouldn't actually say a number of years. I think that we're right about now coming up on one year, if I'm not mistaken.

Mr. Friedman has an extensive background in the anti-war movement that dates back to the 1970s and '60s during the height of the anti-Vietnam protests. In fact, he spent time undercover with a number of the key organizations working for the government, gathering information about their activities to undermine the U.S. support for the war.

Mr. Friedman, welcome to the show.

FRIEDMAN: Nice to be here.

SWETT: Let's start with that. Let's talk a little bit about what it was like from your perspective to be inside some of these major focal points of the anti-war movement.

FRIEDMAN: I got into it by accident. I was doing a graduate paper on public opinion in Vietnam when I was at American University, and I knew what the VFW and American Legion and some of the other groups were saying as their reasons for supporting our efforts in Vietnam.

What I wanted to know for the paper, for the course, was what were the opponents saying, what were they basing their opposition on, and I realized that I wasn't getting enough information out of the newspapers to do a fairly in-depth paper; therefore, I decided to start going to meetings and talking to people and see what they were talking about and what their motivations were. The deeper I got into it, the more I realized that this movement was not kosher, that the people who were leading it eventually through knowledge would turn out to be communists from various groups. The people who were the followers were actually the sheep despite some really good basic motivations for peace, conscientious objectors and moral basis, but they had no influence.

So as I joined one group after another, especially here in Washington, which was the hub of the activity, I began to know the cast of characters, and the cast of characters did not have the red, white and blue at heart. It was mainly the red.

I joined the Washington Mobilization Committee, formed the Washington Peace Council, a member of the Student Mobe, the -

ZIEGLER: And mobe means mobilization committee?

FRIEDMAN: Yes, to end the war in Vietnam. These were a successor of communist united fronts that started in 1967. They had the Spring mobe, November mobe in '67. Then they moved to the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam in 1968/69, and in 1970 as a member of National Mobe, I attended the founding convention of the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, which was its successor, and then there was a split after I got out of it between the Communist Party, which formed the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, and the Trotskyite Communists from the Socialist Workers Party, Young Socialists Alliance, who formed the National Peace Action Coalition.

By being inside, I was able to watch the ideological infighting between the Stalinists and the Trotskyites, and the great part about this was that I would talk to the Trotskyites and they would love to badmouth the Stalinists, and vice versa. So you were getting information from people who knew the real identities of the other people they were dealing with as opposed to the other people who were sitting in the audience who had no idea what was going on who really could care less.

SWETT: So what we have here in effect is a very small number, no more than two or three, major groups controlling large chunks of the anti-war movement basically battling for supremacy. Is that essentially an accurate picture?

FRIEDMAN: Yes, and this happened not only in the anti-war movement but on the campuses where the WEB DuBois Club was formed by the Communist Party. They tried to take over the student movements there, and they got ousted by the Trotskyites who formed a student mobilization committee to end the war in Vietnam.

The Trots had more people on campus, four more chapters, that just took over everything and threw the Communist Party out.

So the Communist Party became a minor factor on the campus, and when you look at the issues of the Student Mobilizer, you look at all the names of the people who led the chapters, and they were all Young Socialist Alliance members or Socialist Workers Party members.

SWETT: How did you know --

ZIEGLER: It was purely a ruse that they threw the Communist Party out because they were socialists themselves.

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, but the ideological infighting was very intense. They would be civil to each other in the open with the united front approach, but behind closed doors there was a lot of snipping and infighting, and I understand at other meetings it actually got fairly nasty, that Terence Hallinan, who is now the district attorney for San Francisco, known as KO Hallinan because he was a boxer, used to go over and punch out Trotskyites at various meetings. They finally had to pull him in because he was just making a spectacle out of himself.

But the united front groups such as Washington Mobilization were a combination of both the Communist Party in the upper echelon leaderships and the Trotskyites in the bodies, the staff of the various Mobe offices. And this went on until after the April 1971 demonstration that John Kerry helped lead because at that time there were joint offices with all the different groups involved. But finally the ideological split got so great that they just split.

By '74 the Trotskyite group, National Peace Action Coalition, had faded to almost nothing, and Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice, which is largely a communist party, still stayed around but was then had been preempted by Tom Hayden's Indochina Peace campaign, which was actually a more native born pro-Hanoi communist movement than the Stalinist groups.

SWETT: Okay, so what you're giving us is pretty much an overview for what was also happening within the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, which many of us took a hard look at during the last election's campaign, last year's campaign.

The Revolutionary Communist Party was in 1971 and into '72 in the process of doing just that kind of takeover, were they not, of the VVAW?

FRIEDMAN: Yes, but there were also other groups. I was reading Gerald Nicosia's book last night and some items from the Congressional Record -

SWETT: That's "Home to War."

FRIEDMAN: -- and what was happening is the Communist Party had some influence on the Vietnam Vets Against the War, which I'll just call VVAW, by actually setting up the original meetings that created with Jan Barry and some of the others, one of whom was Carl Rogers.

SWETT: This was back in '66.

FRIEDMAN: I think it was '67 by then.

SWETT: Okay.

FRIEDMAN: It came out of a group called Veterans for Peace, which was an old congressionally-identified Communist Party front, and the person in charge of that was LeRoy Wolins out of Chicago, who wore many hats out there. Besides being a member of the Communist Party, he was with Veterans for Peace and Chicago Peace Council and a bunch of other groups, and he was the man in the various Mobe groups, especially New Mobe at the convention I attended, where he handled the GI affairs. In fact, he sat two rows behind me. And just to update how red he still is, LeRoy Wolins was one of the people responsible for the Paul Robeson stamp that came out January of this year, and the Communist Party was bragging about it.

So some of the old Reds just never died; they just smell that way.

We always have a little humor within the movement just to -- otherwise, it's so boring sometimes you'd go to sleep.

SWETT: A lot of doctrinal type statements.

How did you - what was the transition for you between starting out as essentially an interested observer and winding up being undercover? Or is that something you can even talk about?

FRIEDMAN: Oh yeah, yeah. I did it purely - it's funny. I was actually the head of a little group called the National Committee to Support our Troops in Vietnam, so I'm running letters to the papers in Washington at the same time I'm undercover with a slightly different name.

So I had two roles, and I never took it seriously in the beginning because I figured all right, I'll go in, I'll find my information for the paper, and come out and do that and that's the end. But then when I got in, I began to see that deception and subversion were the rule, and there were a lot of good people who were duped into joining the movement and supporting it and funding it who probably never would have done so if they knew who actually was running it. And the problem -

SWETT: Useful idiots.


SWETT: Useful idiots, in Lenin terms.

FRIEDMAN: Yes, but some of them were also motivated by religious convictions, and they were neutral in terms of ideology. They just basically wanted the fighting to end, and these were good people. I have nothing against them.

It's the intellectuals and the academics who basically did buy into being useful idiots because they were often told who was running the affair, and they still joined.

Now, an example of an honest Democrat, a liberal Democrat, was Lester Wolf from New York, who when he was told about who was running New Mobe, denounced them publicly in the congressional record and withdrew any support that he and some of his other congressmen might have given them in terms of endorsing the November 1969 march. Lester, I think, was an honest person. Unfortunately, you can't say that for too many of them today.

SWETT: I think we should take a moment to assure our audience that Mr. Friedman is wearing a mask to protect his identity from any vengeful anti-war protestors who may be listening to our show at this time.

We have just published a new article that you have written called, "Did the KGB use John Kerry," in which you present some very interesting new information about exactly how John Kerry came to be speaking at a huge rally, half a million people, organized by the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice, the PCPJ, right at the end of the week in which the Vietnam Veterans Against the War so memorably protested in Washington D.C. and in which John Kerry spoke before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Could you maybe sketch out some of the arguments there.

FRIEDMAN: Essentially a lot of information that we did for the book for "Unfit for Command" and in subsequent writing had been out there in files and in archives for decades, but had never been put together in a coherent context because nobody ever had really called for that need.

One of the results of doing research on "Unfit for Command" was I went back and pulled out a lot of my old files, a couple of the men went down to Texas Tech and Jerry Corsi did a lot of work, and we found documents which by themselves didn't mean too much, but when you put it into the time frame that was being developed about John Kerry's anti-war activities, really began to fill in the holes and began to give some context to what was going on.

One of those was his role as a leader of Vietnam Vets Against the War along with Barry Romo for the Operation Dewey Canyon protest during the April 1971 demonstrations against the war in Vietnam.

Those demonstrations were a joint project of PCPJ, Peoples Coalition for Peach and Justice, which was run by the Communist Party, and the National Peace Action Coalition, and it was done at the behest of the North Vietnamese. Either the North Vietnamese ambassador or Madame Binh, the VC representative, called for this united front because there had been so much of this ideological bickering between the two groups.

SWETT: Okay, so here we have the North Vietnamese and their puppets, the VC, not merely talking to and negotiating with the anti-war movement, but actually directing its activities.

FRIEDMAN: I would say they definitely directed a good part of it, but we have to qualify this, because right now the documents - a lot of the documents we know should exist are not accessible to the public or may have been destroyed. This would be FBI and French surveillance documents, any wiretaps they would have, and things that were in print, and work is being done now to try to track these down from various sources so we can actually publish more of them and show or support the contentions that we're having.

One of the contentions I've made is that the north Vietnamese had very distinct links to the anti-war movement through the Communist Party in the beginning. They did not have very strong links to the Trotskyite communists, even though the Trotskyites were supporting them.

It was through the identified Communist Party members in New Mobe and PCPJ that VVAW began to function around the world and go to various meetings, and this was in some of the work that, Scott, that you had published on Winter Soldier magazine about Al Hubbard's trip to Paris and other places being financed by the Communist Party.

SWETT: To North Vietnam in late 1971, yes.

FRIEDMAN: And that came out of FBI files that had been declassified and had been put on the Internet.

SWETT: You raise an interesting point, which is that although the FBI files on the VVAW as an organization are available, and of course, we made them available online, the individual files from all of the key players in the anti-war movement are not because they're not accessible via Freedom of Information Act. So how do we go about, you know, piecing that together?

FRIEDMAN: well, some of the work I did on "Unfit for Command" was done with the public files at the National Archives. Most of those files are basically newspaper clippings from around the country, and they're often very useful because they have quotes and photographs.

There were also the House Internal Security Committee's hearings on both the New Mobilization Committee and then NPCPJ where they put in a lot of documents. Then you had more work done in terms of the private files a number of us had where we were able to pull out the Al Hubbard letter of April '71 asking - saying that PCPJ was actually helping them plan their Vietnam Vets Against the War's programs.

SWETT: And noting that they had worked together closely in the past and essentially the VVAW was in their debt.

FRIEDMAN: That's it. And there was also a cross membership link. Al Hubbard belonged to PCPJ as well as VVAW, and then Hubbard joined many other groups throughout the years, most of them congressionally-identified communists and Soviet fronts.

ZIEGLER: Max, in the chronology, you're already into 1971, but in May of 1970 John Kerry marries Julia Thorn and they take their honeymoon in Paris, France. Concurrently with that honeymoon, you have the peace negotiations happening within Paris with Madame Binh and Le Duc Tho from the Vietnamese side of the street, the North Vietnamese side of the street. How does a current reserve Naval lieutenant from the U.S. Navy walk into Madame Binh's office in Paris? How does that happen?

FRIEDMAN: It doesn't just happen. It has to be set up through contacts. This is what more recent research has uncovered, including a piece on Pittsburgh Online, which said that Dave Dave Dellinger from New Mobe and PCPJ, who is an old-line communist, was the contact for Kerry with the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese in Paris. Actually, the PRG Vietcong liaison office was outside of Paris, so it's not something you just walk into on your honeymoon. You know, it's like go to Paris and meet the Vietcong while you're at it.

This apparently - there had to be a contact to get Kerry cleared to go see them and to set - make up the arrangements because you and I cannot walk into their mission off the street and get to see somebody. In fact, you probably would never even get inside the mission.


FRIEDMAN: There's other evidence that this also existed through an international committee group apparently out of the New Mobe and PCPJ groups, and there are - hopefully there are documents still in existence which will give you more information, but the name Dave Dellinger and the name Cora Weiss and a couple of the others all show up in these contacts.

Now, there's another contact that I know Scott is just dying to get to, and that's how Kerry got to be on the speaker's platform of the April 24th, 1971, demonstration, and I want to link this together as a way of showing how key communists were the contacts between Vietnam Veterans Against the War, the anti-war movement, and the North Vietnamese and Vietcong around the country.

Scott, is it okay with you if I go along this point for the moment?

SWETT: Sure. We're talking about Abe Feinglass -


SWETT: - who is identified by several sources as Communist Party USA leader. He was - I think he was the head of one of the big meat cutters unions. Is that correct?

FRIEDMAN: Yes. And by the way, the meat cutters and butcher workmen's union.

SWETT: And at that time that union was controlled by Communist Party activists. Go ahead and take it from there.

FRIEDMAN: That union had been controlled for decades - in fact, they elected one of their Communist Party leaders, Charlies Hayes, to congress in the 1980s.

What happened was that PCPJ and Vietnam Veterans Against the War had a working relationship for the April 24th, 1971, demonstration in Washington, which was separate from the Vietnam Veterans Against the War Operation Dewey Canyon demonstration held a little bit earlier.

SWETT: The week leading up to that Saturday.



FRIEDMAN: And what happened was that Kerry was a speaker for Vietnam Veterans Against the War and he was on the speaker's platform on the - I think it was the west steps of the capitol on April 24th, 1971, and next to him with a clipboard and directing it was Abe Feinglass from the Communist Party, who in my opinion was also a Soviet agent of influence because of his contacts and ties to international Soviet fronts that were run by the KGB.

ZIEGLER: Wow. That's the music. We're going to be back in a few minutes after we pay some bills on this Independence Day to talk to Mr. Max Friedman and continue this interesting discussion about the Communist Party USA's influence in the Vietnam Veterans Against the War and other American groups.

We'll be back in a couple of minutes.

[Commercial break]

ZIEGLER: This is The Inquisition on RighTalk.com with Scott Swett and Tim Ziegler on Independence Day. We're interviewing Mr. Max Friedman.

You were just discussing Mr. Abe Feinglass, who was identified with the Communist Party USA and a World Peace Council leader and telling how he was on the steps next to John Kerry, on the west steps of the Capitol next to John Kerry. Take it from there, Mr. Friedman.

FRIEDMAN: Okay. We had a little fun with it. They did a film on John Kerry during the election showing him in his various phases from Vietnam to the demonstrations.

One of the film clips was of John Kerry getting ready to give his speech on the steps of the Capitol on April 24th, 1971, and in that particular photograph, or actually in the film clip and in the photographs we isolated, there were four people on the platform: John Kerry, two people I could not identify, and a little bald-headed guy in a black coat and a clipboard, who was Abe Feinglass.

As I mentioned earlier, Abe Feinglass had been a long-time identified Communist Party labor leader in the Amalgamated Meat Cutters' and Butcher Workmen's Union, AFL-CIO. As a vice-president of the union, he was also a representative to international communist fronts, especially the labor fronts, World Federation of Trade Unions. Therefore, he got to go around the world, and since the World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Peace Council and the others were all run by the KGB and by the Central Committee of the Soviet Union, he was the logical person to be the conduit for KGB orders for not only the Communist Party and labor in the United States but for the Communist Party representatives who were members of the anti-war movement. Abe Feinglass was a member of the steering committees of the various Mobes.

What's interesting, though, is I like to go to communist sources for material rather than some of my own because the people who were writing these materials were basically being very open and very honest, and I would rather take their material and quote their words so that the public understands that I'm not the only one making this allegation or statement.

A Google search was found on Jack Kurweil, who was writing from MIT. He was a member of the Communist Party and he was married to Betina Aptheker, the daughter of the late theoretician of the Communist Party, Herbert Aptheker.

Kurweil wrote about the people on the speaker's platform. This is very important. He said, "New elements of support for the anti-war movement were evident at the speaker's platform. Women, workers, blacks, Chicanos, students, radicals and GI's were all representative in front of the capitol. Included among the speakers were Abe Feinglass from the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, Harold Givens, vice-president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Coretta King, Ralph Abernathy, Representative Bella Abzug, and John Kerry from the VVAW."

SWETT: Okay, so -

FRIEDMAN: If he said he was there and the film shows he was there, I'm going to say all right, now we've got Kerry locked in among a bunch of people who are from the Communist Party, and -

SWETT: Okay, let's back up just a step. Okay, here he is. He's on the platform. There's very little question that Feinglass at least, is a hard-core communist, and possibly, as you suggest, a KGB agent of influence. But merely the fact that he's giving a speech in a sequence of speeches by guys that actually are communists, where's the hard connection that says okay, the reason John Kerry is here giving this speech is because of Feinglass? How do we connect those dots?

FRIEDMAN: This is implied because of the fact that Feinglass was on the steering committee of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice and he was on the platform as the only identifiable senior leader of that particular group, and with the clipboard in his hands, it looked like he was telling the people to come up and speak or had chosen the people who were going to come up and speak, and he was directing this.

SWETT: So, at a minimum it requires Abe Feinglass's blessing for John Kerry to give that speech.

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, to be on that platform, but because of Feinglass's role in the anti-war movement among and leading the so-called anti-war labor people and his long, long membership in the Communist Party, there's no question that the people in PCPJ chose him as a leadership role at that particular place at that particular time.

Now, there were other communists also out there who were working on the demonstration, some behind the scenes, some by speakers. You had Representative Bella Abzug as one of the speakers, and Bella Abzug's identification as a member of the Communist Party has not been made public, but we're hoping in the future to have the documentation showing that she was a covert member of the Communist Party and that she also, based on her record in the 1940s, was probably a Soviet agent of influence. Her contacts as a student and then in politics with the various Soviet International fronts went way beyond anything that just a so-called peace protestor would actually have.

SWETT: Is it possible that this removed to have any sense for how much John Kerry could have known about, you know, exactly who he was dealing with or could he have been under the illusion these were, you know, merely honest people opposing the war?

FRIEDMAN: This is a two-fold issue. One is what was known publicly at the time that he might have been aware of as opposed to what he was thinking about himself. There were hearings on Impact and PCPJ, and New Mobe had been going on since 1969 with Mike's testimony.

So there was information out there that Abe Feinglass had been identified as a member of the Communist Party, and a good number of the people from New Mobe and PCPJ: Leo Fenster, Irving Sarnoff, Leroy Wolins, and a good number of others were identified as party members and were in the regional offices, the head of the regional offices, of New Mobe and then PCPJ.

So if he was interested in it, the information was out there in print and some of it in the newspapers. Whether he saw it or not is another question, one I cannot answer.

The second point is that Kerry was an opportunist. He would use anybody and everybody to advance his own goals. He did this in Vietnam, as we showed in the book "Unfit for Command." He did it in politics when he was working with Drinan and a number of the others.

Every time there was an opportunity to advance himself, either in publicity or politically, he took that opportunity, and a good example was his 1972 running for - getting ready to run for congress because he jumped out of Vietnam Veterans Against the War just at the time that the Maoists were making their push to take over the organization, which they completed in mid to late '73. And this is where you mentioned the Revolutionary Communist Party -

SWETT: Uh-huh.

FRIEDMAN: - and also the Revolutionary Union, which was another small faction led by H. Bruce Franklin, who is now a professor at Rutgers.

So Kerry - I don't think he gave a damn who he worked with. He was - he may have been genuinely anti-Vietnam, but when you look at his speeches and the fact that he allowed Al Hubbard to stay in Vietnam Vets Against the War against their own constitution, he just didn't care. Okay?

I think that the not caring is probably more important from my point of view than the fact that he would have done something consciously. I don't think he's smart enough to do something that conscious. But also his contacts with the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong in Paris, at least on one trip in 1970, and maybe even later, really raised a lot of questions of is this guy stupid or did he really just not care and think that he was going to be the great leader of the anti-war movement and rise up through the ranks into politics, which is what he did, and that's how he got elected.

He didn't get elected because he was a brilliant guy. His activities since and his record in congress show that he's not a brilliant guy. He's good at bluffing and covering up things, but if you look at him for merit, there just isn't anything there.

SWETT: Well, at a minimum it seems that there were a number of very hard Left or very unsavory characters also in Vietnam Veterans Against the War that Kerry didn't draw the line at working with.

Scott Camil, long before Kerry decided to leave the VVAW, had already raised the topic of assassinating United States senators. He originally wanted to do that at the Dewey Canyon protest, which that hasn't received a lot of publicity to this point. Most people are familiar with the November '71 thing.

Then you've got Joe Bangert and people like Joe Urgo. Can you comment on some of the really hard-core folks who were movers and shakers in the VVAW from the far Left?

FRIEDMAN: In the beginning - this is what I was reading in Nicosia's book the other night - you had Jan Crumb and six or seven other guys who formed the organization. Out of that group, I could only identify one who I personally knew who I knew was hard core, and that was Carl Rogers. The others disappeared: A fellow named Rocks (phonetic) and a few of the others, you never heard of them after a year or so.

What happened was Scot Camil had came in, and I think the guy was certifiably whacko because of statements he made himself, allegations he made about war crimes which were physically impossible for anybody to do.

SWETT: For example?

FRIEDMAN: I believe he was he the one that said he skinned 150 bodies of Vietnamese men and women in one day or something. You can't do that. You can't skin a body -

SWETT: Just mechanically you can't do it that fast.

FRIEDMAN: Right, not 150, and if there was 150, it would have been all over Vietnam propaganda, even if it was 10 it would have been out there, and there was just - I don't ever recall the Vietcong ever claiming this. So his claims were outlandish.

Now, Camil's war record was admirable. He had a good record as a combat soldier. But I think he just snapped and he just went off on the loony Left of VVAW, and he was joined by others who were also very hard-core Maoists.

And you have Barry Romo and you got guys like Bangert, you've got Urgo. These people show up not only often in the Revolutionary Communist Party, but also in Vets for Peace today, Vietnam Veterans Against the Iraqi War.

SWETT: Iraq Veterans Against the War, I think they call it.

Well, Bangert continues to be a close confidant of Kerry to this day. He was on the platform where Kerry introduced his band of brothers at the Democratic National Committee, so that he hasn't disavowed him in any way, shape or form.

FRIEDMAN: No. I think he was also an organizer for Kerry in terms of veterans going out in the various states to organize.

Again, this calls into question whether Kerry knew about these guys' backgrounds or whether he really cared. If he knew about it and allowed them to work with him, that's one thing. If he didn't care, it shows the man just has no moral base of operation. He's just a pure opportunist.

SWETT: Some would say that makes him the perfect politician.

FRIEDMAN: It would, but he's not the kind of guy I want representing me. I mean, I don't really care if I have a liberal or conservative representing me if they're an honest person and they go into this eyes wide open. If you go into it eyes wide shut and use everybody and really hurt your country, then I have a total objection to that kind of person.

SWETT: Let's switch gears a bit. You were talking earlier about an allegation by a reporter that David Dellinger was the guy that actually put Kerry in touch with the North Vietnamese communists in Paris in mid 1970. Can you elaborate a little bit on who Dellinger was and what his background is. I think he's largely forgotten today.

FRIEDMAN: Fortunately for the world, Dellinger died last year. They say don't speak ill of the dead. I speak ill of traitors, and Dellinger was that. He was supposedly a pacifist during World War II, but he refused to do any alternative service.

Now, there are a lot of conscientious objectors, especially from some of the religious minority groups, who did alternative service. They worked in the hospitals. Many - some of them actually worked as combat medics.

Dellinger did not oppose Hitler at a time when he was committing mass genocide around the world. That really calls into question his commitment to peace, and as we will talk about later, I assume, I'm going to get into some of the really good stuff.

ZIEGLER: We are going to get into the good stuff. You hear the music in the background.

This is RighTalk.com, The Inquisition with Scott Swett and Tim Ziegler, and we're interviewing Mr. Max Friedman. We'll be back after this break and we'll continue the discussion on Independence Day about traitors and freedom and -

SWETT: And other good stuff like that.

ZIEGLER: - and other good stuff like that.

[Commercial break]

ZIEGLER: This is RighTalk.com with The Inquisition, Scott Swett and Tim Ziegler, and we're talking to Mr. Max Friedman.

You know, gentlemen, in this discussion we've been having, these names are almost like they're from ancient history. I think it's great to document this, but last week when the president gave a speech at Ft. Bragg, John Kerry came out that night and just ripped the president, and it reminded me of the speeches from the 1970s in which John Kerry was ripping President Nixon for the conduct of the war in Vietnam.

Mr. Friedman, can you connect those things for me.

FRIEDMAN: Yes. When I heard John Kerry's sort of rebuttal speech to that, I said, "Here we go again." It's literally identical, point by point, to Kerry's arguments and senate presentation that there was a - the Vietcong had a seven-point peace plan, how to get out - it was seven to eight - and withdraw U.S. troops, and then the POWs would be released.

The other night when Kerry made his rebuttal, he said, you know, essentially, set a date, Mr. President. Start withdrawing troops. Do this and do that and then let the Iraqis settle their own fate, which is exactly the old communist line of self determination of the people of Vietnam, which meant North Vietnamese troops coming in and determining it for them. In this case it would be letting the terrorists come in and decide the fate of the Iraqi people.

So there's a lot of deja vu here, and a lot of the same players are still around. Cora Weiss is still around working on Iraq. Dellinger was until he died. But you've also got some other people that you know from their protests that don't get a lot of adequate coverage, and that's the old Trotskyite now Stalinist group called Workers World Party, who actually held the first anti-Vietnam demonstration in the United States in 1967.

Today they have front groups known as ANSWER and the International Action Center and use Ramsey Clark as their front man. So you have Brian Becker, who came out of Youth Against War and Fascism and Workers World Party in the early 1970s, and you have Larry Holmes, who came out of the anti-war leftist movement from the late '60s and the early '70s, who became the Workers World Party, I think, presidential candidate a number of years ago.

They have joined with other old leftists - and we can't get rid of these people. You've got Medea Benjamin, with her Code Pink.

SWETT: Sure.

FRIEDMAN: Medea Benjamin's an old Castroite. You have United for Peace and Justice, which is Leslie Cagan, and she is actually the oldest communist work horse from the original Spring Mobilization Committees in 1967, and her other co-partner is C. Clark Kissinger, an old Maoist SDS leader, who is now in the Revolutionary Communist Party. And also there's Not in Our Name and a few other groups.

The same people who were young then are now leading these groups and the ultimate goal is not the overthrow of the government of the United States. They've given up on that form of communist action. It is the undermining of the will of the United States to resist totalitarianism around the world whether it is Red Chinese as a threat, Russia as a threat, or Islamic fascism as a threat. The old the enemy of my enemy is my friend concept. SWETT: It seems, from the way they act, that - you know, many of us would assume that, okay, they're communists so they're cheering for the Soviet Union to defeat the United States and try to assist their proxy, the North Vietnamese. But here the governments - the organizations they're sponsoring now are not particularly communist. They're international terrorism, so as you say, it's the friend of my enemy. Anything that opposes the interest of the United States is where you're going to find all these guys, isn't it?

ZIEGLER: Right. It's the hate America first crowd.

SWETT: Yeah.

FRIEDMAN: It's not only that. It's not just the psychotic hate, which the Workers World Party is great at because most of them are psychotic, and the Maoists too, in order to be as steeped in their ideology as they are.

If you had a bunch of psychiatrists sit down and look at these, they'd get up in five minutes and say, "These people are crazy; let's get out of here."

But they are a danger because they are dedicated. They work 24 hours a day. They have adequate funding, especially in foundations, some of which were Communist Party, some of which are affiliated with George Soros and the other groups. And they are able to attract all the fringes, and they multiply their power that way. Where you may have 500 or 1,000 members of Workers World Party and affiliates, they bring in the Revolutionary Communist Party people, C. Clark Kissinger, they bring in the Leslie Cagan people, which is a part of the Communist Party faction called Committee of Correspondents. And you bring in the leftist academics, which are breeding like mosquitoes out there, and you've got a heck of a lot of people. And then you have your church people, like Webber and -

SWETT: National Council of Churches and -

FRIEDMAN: Yeah. They're still doing the same old pro-communist anti-American garbage. They just don't say they're for the communists anymore. They don't say they're out there cheering for North Korea, but they don't want us to do anything about North Korea except to surrender or negotiate, whatever they want to. The same with Iran. The arguments are all the same.

They're also very anti-Semitic. They're very anti-Israel, and they have joined with the Islamists in that sphere of influence to attack the United States.

So it's a multi-hinged attack against the United States from all over the globe on terms of American foreign policy, and they have allies in England. The Socialist Party there is very strong. You have the same thing in Australia. You've got the old French Labor Party, the general confederation of trade unions there, which is Communist Party and some of the strong leftist contingent.

These can turn out a heck of a lot of people at protests. And when people say, well, public opinion is against the United States, and the media is showing all these demonstrations, you have to look behind the signs. Look at the sign, then look behind the signs to see who's running it.

In the United States, it's not Code Pink, it's Code Red.

ZIEGLER: And the typical radio host or typical media person is going to look at you and say, "Mr. Friedman, you're going to see a communist under every bush." You know, "This sounds like McCarthyism."

FRIEDMAN: Well, I don't think we're going to find any communists around George Bush.

No, you have to know your target. Just like in the military. You don't go out and just shoot up a tree line and waste ammunition. You have to have a target to shoot at.

Having been an investigative reporter in this as well as having been inside this group for over 35 years, when I see a familiar face pop up or a familiar name, I say, you know, my antennae are up. Oh, he's back.

It happened yesterday with someone on the Middle East named Abdullah Schleifer. His name came up at a conference that was very anti-Israel, and we helped expose him as a member of the Progressive Labor Party back in 1970. Now this guy's popping up again in the news 35 years later.

They're like vampires. You can drive a stake into their heart, but unless you keep driving it in and driving it in, they keep popping up in a new reincarnation.

The media has no memory as to who these people are, nor do most of them have the inclination to go in and do good investigative journalism. It's very, very shallow. It's sound bites; it's press releases; it's whatever somebody says, and they take them at their word and then they move on to the next story. You can't be a good journalist like that.

SWETT: One fairly obvious example of a vampire popping up under a slightly new incarnation is the rebirth of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War as the Veterans Against the Iraqi War, and of course, a lot of the old-time VVAW people created that organization.

We'll touch on that a little bit when we get back.


ZIEGLER: This is RighTalk Radio, RighTalk.com, The Inquisition, the fastest hour in radio. Scott Swett, Tim Ziegler, with Mr. Max Friedman. We'll be back in three minutes to finish the show up.

Happy Fourth of July, America. It's your Independence Day.

[Commercial break]

SWETT: Hello, and welcome back to RighTalk Radio. This is The Inquisition with Scott Swett and Tim Ziegler. We're here visiting with Mr. Max Friedman, journalist, researcher, in-depth expert in the anti-war movement during the Vietnam era and on through today.

We were talking about the topic of how events of 30 years ago compare to what's happening now, and one example that leaps to mind is Senator Durbin's recent and justly criticized comments about American prisons resembling the gulags and the Nazi camps. Is this just the same record that these guys played 35 years ago? Are they trying to do it again?

FRIEDMAN: Many of them are. Durbin, I think, is just a fool, but the hard-core left are using the tactics from the Vietnam protests today.

Unfortunately for us, many of them are now in academia, which gives them a venue of being published in books and in journals and in newspapers. They propagate the same lies against the United States that they were then, and their goal is to undermine our efforts to defend ourselves and to defend freedom and to defeat the enemy. It was the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong, and we were doing a pretty good job of it. They undercut that. Now they want to undercut our efforts in Iraq, hope we fail, blame it on the Republicans and then try to come back into power through the Democratic Party.

SWETT: In your dealings with the hard-core Left inside the anti-war movement, did you ever hear any of them express remorse after Saigon fell and the blood bath started in Southeast Asia over what they'd done?

FRIEDMAN: I heard absolutely none, and that was what was shocking because I felt that a few of them might have been legitimate, other than Joan Baez around '79 protesting conditions in the reeducation camps.

SWETT: In Cambodia, yeah.

FRIEDMAN: Well, not just Cambodia, but also in South Vietnam, and she was viciously attacked by Jane Fonda and the others on the Left.

ZIEGLER: It's been the fastest hour in radio again. You can find the articles by Mr. Friedman on the Vietnam Veterans Legacy site -

SWETT: No, no, no.

ZIEGLER: - as well as WinterSoldier.com. We look forward to Mr. Friedman coming back sometime.

FRIEDMAN: I'd love to come back. Thank you.

ZIEGLER: Thank you for being here. This is RighTalk.com, The Inquisition with Scott Swett and Tim Ziegler, and the web site you can find that on again is WinterSoldier.com.

This is RighTalk on the way out. Scott Swett and Tim Ziegler will be back in two weeks. Happy Fourth of July.

[End of transcript]

Monday, October 18, 2010

The Left's most vicious myth about the Vietnam War - The Blame for Cambodia's fall

From "No More Vietnams" by Richard Nixon

Of all the myths about the Vietnam War, the most vicious one is the idea that the United States was morally responsible for the atrocities committed after the fall of Cambodia in 1975. The critics charged that the actions we took against North Vietnam's Cambodian sanctuaries, starting with the bombing of Communist bases in 1969, began a series of events that brought the murderous Khmer Rouge to power. This is a total distortion of history and complete perversion of moral judgment.

The myth ran like this: Our secret bombing in 1969 not only slaughtered countless civilians but also pushed the Vietnamese Communist forces deeper into Cambodia and thereby destabilized Sihanouk's neutral government. Our incursions against the sanctuaries in 1970 swept peaceful Cambodia into the war and led the North Vietnamese to give massive aid to their Communist Khmer Rouge allies. Therefore, because American actions set in motion the events that brought the Khmer Rouge to power, the United States was to blame for ensuing holocaust, in which over 2 million Cambodians were killed.

These arguments are wrong on every point. Our bombing caused minimal civilian casualties because the Communists had long before cleared all Cambodians out of their base areas. A Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum written in April 1969 pointed out that "Cambodians rarely go into areas under de facto control of the [National Liberation Front and North Vietnamese Army]." It added, "Cambodian villages and populated areas are readily identified and can be essentially avoided in conducting preplanned operations into the base areas."

Nor did our bombing destabilize Sihanouk's government. No evidence exists to show that our 1969 air strikes pushed the Vietnamese Communist forces deeper into Cambodia. These forces grew at the time of the bombing, both because a steady stream of new troops was coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and because United States and South Vietnamese military sweeps in South Vietnam were pushing more Communist troops into Cambodia. But none of these forces went deeper into Cambodia as a result of the bombing. Communist forces simply dispersed themselves and their supplies more widely along the border with South Vietnam.

Sihanouk was overthrown because of discontent, both among the people and within the government, over his unwillingness to take vigorous steps to expel the Vietnamese Communist forces from the country. Years later Sihanouk admitted as much, saying, "If I lost my Fauteuil presidentiel and my Chamcar Mon Palace in Phnom Penh to Marshal Lon Nol who occupied them for five years, it was because I tremendously helped the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese."

Our incursions into Cambodia in 1970 did not widen the war. Since 1965, North Vietnam's forces had occupied the border areas of Cambodia. In March 1970, Hanoi infiltrated into Cambodia over 20,000 Khmer Rouge guerrillas who had been trained in North Vietnam. In April, after Cambodia's government tried to reassert its authority over its own territory — hardly an unreasonable demand — North Vietnam launched an invasion of the country. Hanoi's delegate to the private peace talks in Paris freely admitted to us that North Vietnam intended to bring down the government in Phnom Penh. In May and June, when American and South Vietnamese forces cleared out the Communist sanctuaries, Cambodia was already swept up in the war. If we had not acted, we would have guaranteed the victory of the Communist forces both in Cambodia and South Vietnam. Thus, the charge that our incursion drove the North Vietnamese out of the border areas and toward Phnom Penh is false on its face. The Vietnamese Communists moved deeper into Cambodia two weeks after the fall of Sihanouk and a month before our incursion occurred.

During the war in Vietnam, those who now concoct apologias for Indochina's totalitarians opposed American policies that sought to prevent a Communist victory and the human tragedy that would follow inevitably in its wake. No doubt these apologists are now at least subconsciously motivated by feelings of guilt. Simple ethics holds those who took an action responsible for its consequences. To assign blame for the genocide in Cambodia to those in the United States who sought to prevent a Communist victory, rather than to the Communists who committed the atrocities, is an immoral act in and of itself.

Nixon on the "Secret Bombing"

Friday, October 15, 2010

Diem - The Real Story

From "No More Vietnams", by Richard Nixon

Being a ruler of a Third World country usually means making enemies. Diem was no exception. He was a bold decision-maker, initiating vast programs for the betterment of his country. Often, he alienated those who supported a different plan or who saw his reforms as a threat to their interests in preserving the status quo.

Like all leaders, Diem made some poor decisions. He replaced the old custom of village self-government with a centralized system of appointed leaders, thereby undermining the local initiative on which democracy depends. He alienated many important civilian and military leaders in the aftermath of an attempted coup against him in 1960. He started to rely too heavily for his rule on members of his own family. As his strong political base began to erode, he became more authoritarian.

Diem jealously guarded his independence, often rejecting or ignoring the advice of his American advisers. After all, he was a proud Vietnamese nationalist who would not take orders from Americans any more than he had from the French. "America has a magnificent economy and many good points," he once told a reporter. "But does your strength at home automatically mean that the United States is entitled to dictate everything here in Vietnam, which is undergoing a type of war that your country has never experienced?"

Diem assumed that despite his occasional difference of opinion with American policymakers, the United States was an ally he could depend on in the end. He also assumed that the United States saw no alternative to his leadership. He was wrong on both counts.

As Kennedy and his advisers grew increasingly unhappy with their strong-willed ally, they began to lose sight of the fact that the issue was not whether South Vietnam would develop a perfect constitutional democracy but whether it would have a government capable of resisting an expansion of Communist control that would destroy all democracy. While assassinations, abductions, and terrorist and guerrilla raids proliferated , our officials acted as if the real problem were gerrymandered electoral districts and stuffed ballot boxes.

The crisis that convinced the Kennedy administration to abandon Diem began in May 1963. After Catholics flew dozens of Vatican flags during public celebrations in Danang, Diem, himself a Catholic, enacted a law to prevent the subordination of the national flag to religious ones. It prohibited any group from flying its flag in public demonstrations; the display of within a house of flags within a house of worship was not affected. Buddha's birthday fell two days later, with major celebrations scheduled across the country. Diem was aware that many Buddhists would fly their banner without knowing about the new law, so he suspended enforcement of it.

Word of Diem's action arrived too late in Hue, and what became known as the "Buddhist crisis" resulted. Local police took down several Buddhist flags that were flying above the South Vietnamese banner. Thich Tri Quang, a Buddhist priest who practiced his politics more devoutly than his religion and who was eager to find fault with the Catholic President, delivered a bristling antigovernment tirade in his pagoda during religious ceremonies.

Hue's Buddhists were primed for dissent. Mayor Ngo Dinh Thuc, who was one of Diem's brothers, was a notorious religious bigot. Tri Quang took a recording of his anti-Diem speech to a radio station and demanded that it be broadcast. Outside the station, a bomb exploded in the crowd of protesters who had followed him, killing eight people. Buddhist leaders accused government soldiers of detonating an American-made concussion grenade. Diem denied the charge, and a United Nations commission eventually determined that the blast resulted not from a grenade but from plastic explosives, a favorite weapon of the National Liberation Front. But the Buddhists escalated their political attacks and demanded that Diem personally accept responsibility for the tragedy.

Then, on June 11, a Buddhist monk doused himself with gasoline and set himself on fire in protest against Diem's government. The next day, the grisly picture of the scene — the monk with his hands clasped in prayer as the flames consumed him — ran on the front page of almost every American newspaper.

The monk's self-immolation was a carefully contrived ritual staged for the American news media. Buddhist leaders had tipped off the press beforehand and afterward quickly distributed mimeographed copies of antigovernment letters copies of antigovernment letters purportedly written by the monk. None of that was reported. The picture stood alone and seared a single word into the minds of many Americans: repression.

Here a small group of influential American reporters in Saigon, all of whom opposed Diem, had a decisive impact on events. Some of them worked for the United States' most influential newspapers. They accepted almost any anti-Diem accusation as gospel, and met frequently to compare stories with one another so that their line would be consistent. Tri Quang rightly considered them allies, so much so that he distributed copies of their stories as propaganda to win converts. That the South Vietnamese President was a devout Catholic made him an ideal candidate to be painted as a repressor of Buddhists. During the crisis, the reporters obligingly portrayed Diem as an enemy of all the people and a holdover from the French colonialist who practiced ruthless repression against nationalist and Buddhist South Vietnamese.They wrote that 70 percent of the South Vietnamese were Buddhist. The true figure was at most 30 percent.

Facts, however, were not important to these correspondents. Undercutting Diem, perhaps even destroying him, was all that mattered. This was one of the few times during the Vietnam War when the United States government and the American press would find themselves working toward the same goal.

The issue of religious repression was a complete fabrication. Diem appointed his top officials without regard to their faith. Of his eighteen cabinet ministers, five were Catholic, five Confucianist, and eight Buddhist, including the vice president and the foreign minister. Of his thirty-eight provincial governors, twelve were Catholic and twenty-six were either Confucianist or Buddhist. Of his nineteen top generals, three were Catholic and sixteen were Taoist, Confucianist, or Buddhist. He permitted Buddhists to exempt themselves from mandatory military service on religious grounds, while Catholics and others were required to serve. No Buddhist was ever arrested for practicing his religion, and not a single piece of credible evidence has ever been produced to show that Diem repressed Buddhists on the basis of religion.

Politics, not religion, was on the minds of those behind the crisis. A few ambitious Vietnamese had shaved their heads, donned Buddhist monk's clothing, and contrived the crisis to advance their own political agenda. Their leader was Tri Quang, and they operated out of the Xa Loi pagoda in Saigon. It was hardly a place of reverence. Mimeograph copiers churned out propaganda sheets. Organizers barked out instructions on where to hold the day's demonstrations. Messengers hurried about with newly painted banners. Journalists and photographers milled around hoping to get the inside word on the location of the next burning. Anyone who glanced in the door could see that the Xa Loi pagoda was not a house of worship but the political headquarters of a movement intent on bringing down Diem's government.

During a United Nations investigation of the charges against Diem, two young Buddhists who had been prevented from burning themselves to death testified about how Tri Quang's General Buddhist Association had recruited them. Both were told horror stories about how Diem's government was burning pagodas and beating, torturing, and disemboweling Buddhists. One said a recruiter told him that "the Buddhist Association worked for the Communists" and that ten volunteers were needed for death by fire. After he volunteered, he was told that the "suicide-promotion group would make all the arrangements." This included providing him with a gasoline-soaked robe, driving him to a location that would maximize publicity, and writing letters of protest for him that would be handed out to the waiting press.

The other, who came from a remote province, said he was horrified when a recruiter told him Diem had burned Saigon's pagodas. He volunteered to die when he was informed that by doing so he might be reincarnated as a Buddha. He was brought to the capital and given a carefully prescribed route, designed to avoid the city's thoroughly intact pagodas, to reach the location for his suicide. When he changed course because a street was blocked off, he came upon a pagoda where Buddhists were peacefully worshiping. He then voluntarily surrendered to a policeman.

Just as he sought to deceive the world, Tri Quang deceived his victims in order to achieve his political ends. After Diem had yielded to all reasonable demands, Tri Quang injected unreasonable ones to keep the crisis alive. He was interested not in compromise but in conflict. As one monk at Xa Loi asked a reporter, "How many suicides will it take to get rid of Diem?"
Tri Quang made no secret of his real goals. He had been arrested twice by the French for working with the Viet Minh. He admitted that after 1945 he had served with Buddhist groups that were nothing more than Communist front organizations to help Ho's army. He was a disciple of Thich Tri Do, the leader of the Communist-dominated Buddhist church in North Vietnam, and had once said that Buddhism was entirely compatible with communism. On one occasion, a reporter asked Tri Quang whether it was ethical to induce young monks to commit suicide in so painful a manner just to be able to fly the Buddhist flag a notch or two higher. Tri Quang shrugged his shoulders and said with perfect candor that "in a revolution many things must be done."

Storms of outrage broke out in the United States and Europe when the Buddhist suicides began. Sensationalized news media reports made matters even worse. The suicides were political ploys by a few fanatic extremists, but the media said they represented the mainstream opinion of South Vietnamese Buddhists. The press played up the Buddhists as oppressed holy people, and the world blamed their political target, Diem.

Most critics attributed the suicides to Diem's repression. Nobody seemed to notice when the number of suicides increased after he was overthrown. The radical Buddhists had sought to get rid of Diem not because of religious repression but because he blocked the road to a revolutionary overthrow of South Vietnam's non-Communist government.

News-media reports of Buddhist repression had the desired effect: They turned American public opinion against Diem. One of the three reasons Secretary of State Dean Rusk listened when the Kennedy administration first considered abandoning Diem in August 1963 was the pressure of American public opinion.

The Buddhist crisis escalated dramatically on August 21 when Diem sent units of his special forces to raid the pagodas at the center of the Buddhist rebellion. Diem had not singled out the Buddhists; he would have cracked down on any group that openly sought to overturn the government. His forces did not rampage through holy places. No one was killed. They seized only pagodas, like Xa Loi, that were political command posts. Diem's raids affected just twelve of South Vietnam's 4776 pagodas. His troops seized spears, daggers, guns, and plastic molds for making bombs, together with His troops seized spears, daggers, guns, and plastic molds for making bombs, together with documents linking the radical Buddhists to the National Liberation Front.

Kennedy's advisers now lost all perspective. They accused Diem of outright repression. Even recently, a top official from that era displayed his lack of understanding by characterizing the crisis as one in which "a Frenchified Catholic Vietnamese President began to beat up the pagodas and kill Buddhist priests and Buddhist nuns." This view was typical and totally at odds with the facts. Kennedy's anti-Diem advisers had refused to believe the balanced reports on the crisis sent previously by Ambassador Frederick Nolting and instead came to rely on the news accounts of stridently anti-Diem reporters. Roger Hilsman, the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, summed up the Kennedy administration's attitude when he commented, "After the closing of the pagodas on August 21, the facts became irrelevant."

And the rest is history.

Friday, October 1, 2010

The Guatemala STD experiments and the overthrown Reds of 1954

I don't know all the details, alarming and discusting as they are (and I agree with President Obama's decision to apologize to the victims on behalf of the United States). but I do know a bit about the reaction
"Guatemala condemned the experiment as a crime against humanity and said it would study whether there were grounds to take the case to an international court.

"President Alvaro Colom considers these experiments crimes against humanity and Guatemala reserves the right to denounce them in an international court," said a government statement, which announced a commission to investigate the matter."

here is the problem
The experiments were discovered by Susan M. Reverby, a medical historian and professor of women’s studies at Wellesley College in Wellesley, Mass., ...

From 1946 to 1948, she wrote in an article due to appear in January in The Journal of Policy History, Dr. John C. Cutler, a Public Health Service doctor, ran a syphilis inoculation project in Guatemala, co-sponsored by the health service, the National Institutes of Health, the Pan American Health Sanitary Bureau and the Guatemalan government.

I don't believe the Guatemalan government has taken any responsibility for their part, or perhaps give recognition to those who liberated Guatemala from those responsible - the CIA in 1954.

At the time of these experiments, Guatemala was run by "Spiritual Socialist" Juan Jose Arevalo (President 1944-1951). Time writes that Jules Dubois, the Chicago Tribune's "veteran Latin America correspondent" had "reported as early as 1948 that the Arevalo regime was Communist-infiltrated". And as Time also writes, Arevalo had a big problem in the form of Strongman Jacobo Arbenz
In 1944, when dictator-ridden Guatemala was ripe for revolution, Arbenz, then working from El Salvador, helped mastermind the uprising. When "Spiritual Socialist" Juan Jose Arevalo assumed the presidency, Arbenz took over the job of defense minister. Last summer (1949) a crisis arose when Arbenz' revolutionary comrade, Colonel Francisco Arana, chief of the armed forces, began acting too big for his job. At a cabinet meeting one day, President Arevalo stared at Arana across the table and said: "There are two presidents here, and one of them has a machine gun."

Time speculated that he was referring to Arana, but it became clear later that Arbenz who held that shadow "machine gun President" when the leader of the 1954 freedom fighters Carlos Castillo Armas testified that
"The Communists concentrated first on the labor unions, of which they quickly gained complete control, "he explained. "Soon it became almost impossible to be elected to public office without the support of the unions . . . A teachers' union was formed, and before long almost every teacher in the country, in order to hold his job, had to teach the Communist doctrines . . . The Communists had political control of Guatemala by the time [former President Juan José] Arévalo's term expired [in 1951]. When their hand-picked candidate, Jacobo Arbenz, took office, they finally dared to come out into the open."

Earlier this year (2010), in an interview with the official newspaper of communist Cuba, an old Nicaraguan communist named Rodolfo Romero who was in Guatemala during Arbenz's reign confirmed that Arbenz turned Guatemala into communist base and insurrectionist staging ground teeming with reds from all over Latin America who were receiving shelter, training and Soviet supplied Czech weapons.

It was these reds and their controlled Guatemalan governments that took part in these experiments, and these are the reds that were brought down by the CIA and our Guatemalan freedom fighter allies in 1954.

I don't know all the details of the experiments yet, but I thought it would be worthwhile to preempt the inevitable self-rightous Commie/red squawking if nobody else is willing to do it. I hope that the Guatemalan government takes responsibility for their predecessor's role in this atrocity, just as the United States government has.

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

In 1957, Communist Che parroted a CPUSA Stalinist hack's propaganda about the 1956 Hungarian Revolution; the CP Stalinist later admitted he was lying

In 1957, while Che was in the mountains in Cuba

Che defended the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. The Soviets suppressed the revolt by freedom fighters in Hungary. If Che was truly on the side of the oppressed, he would’ve supported the Hungarian revolts and opposed the Soviet invasion. But that wasn’t the case. During his time as a “fighter” in the July 26th movement, which was led by Fidel Castro, the future totalitarian Communist dictator of Cuba, Che defended the Soviet invasion of Hungary. His defense of the Soviet invasion got him into a real heated fight with another member of the July 26th movement. How can we know that? Humberto Fontova, the author of the eye-opening book “Exposing the real Che Guevara and the useful idiots who idolize him”, had an interview with that member’s brother on the fight between him and Che. Page 46 of his book even stated what the member’s brother said.

In that fight, Che called the Hungarian rebels “Fascists” and “CIA agents”. He stated that the Soviets had a duty to invade Hungary and to oppress the freedom fighters who sought freedom and independence. That was just a small taste of what Che Guevara was “fighting” for ["Fought" and "fighting" are in quotation marks because Che wasn't a real Guerrilla fighter, but a coward who loved killing innocent people off the battlefield].

This is telling because in that same year Communist Party USA's leading Stalinist theorist, and incestuous pedophile, Herbert Aptheker "wrote a defense of the Soviet invasion [a book called "The Truth About Hungary"], claiming that Hungarians rejoiced when they saw the Soviet tanks rolling into their nation" and vilified Hungarian freedom fighters as fascists.

This is telling because they knew it was a lie, and they didn't care. See the following post on a historical forum from historian and ex-Communist Ron Radosh

Subject: Aptheker's "The Truth about Hungary" (Radosh)

Re Mark Kramer's incisive comments on Aptheker's "The Truth About Hungary." Decades ago, when Aptheker and I were still talking, I asked him about the book. He replied: "I had a job to do for the Party, and I did it." It was as simple as that.

I would also mention that right after he wrote the book, the Trotskyist Shane Mage authored a pamphlet "The Truth About Herbert Aptheker's 'The Truth About Hungary,'" which dissected the methodology in a devastating fashion. And during the rebellion itself, many Communists could learn the truth about the rebellion from the dispatches from Hungary by Peter Freyer, the British Daily Worker's correspondent. Freyer could not but help see, since he was on the scene, that this was a working-class rebellion against Stalinism, and not a fascist coup that the Soviets were putting down.

Ron Radosh

Tuesday, September 7, 2010

The Berlin blockage of 1948-1949 was a diversion from the communist takeover of China

According to Former Soviet deputy spy-chief Pavel Sudoplatov

The information [Atomic spy Klaus] Fuchs gave us in 1948 coincided with [British diplomate and Soviet agent Donald] Maclean's reports from Washington on America's limited nuclear potential, not sufficient to wage an all-out and prolonged war. Maclean had become first secretary and acting head of chancery at the British Embassy in 1944.

Looking back, one may say that in every scientific team, both in the Soviet Union and in the United States, there were politically motivated figures, Kurchatov in the Soviet Union, Edward Teller in America. Kurchatov always kept the interests of the state first in his mind. He was less stubborn and less independent than men like Kapitsa or loffe. Beria, Pervukhin, and Stalin immediately sensed that he was different from the scientists of the older generation; they saw that he was young, ambitious, and fully prepared to subordinate academic traditions to the interests of the state. When the government wanted to speed up the test of our first atomic bomb in 1949, Kurchatov went along with copying the American design. However, parallel work continued on the Soviet-designed bomb, which was exploded in 1951. In the United States, Edward Teller assumed a similar role later, when he was put in charge of the hydrogen bomb project.

Oppenheimer reminded me very much of our classic scientists who tried to maintain their own identity, their own world, and their total internal independence. It was a peculiar independence and an illusion, because both Kurchatov and Oppenheimer were destined to be not only scientists but also directors of huge government-sponsored projects. The conflict was inevitable; we cannot judge them, because the bomb marked the opening of a new era in science, when for the first time in history scientists were required to act as statesmen. Initially neither Oppenheimer nor Kurchatov was surrounded by the scientific bureaucracies that later emerged in the 1950s. In the 1940s, neither government was in a position to control and influence scientific progress, because there was no way to progress except to rely on a group of geniuses and adjust to their needs, demands, and extravagant behavior. Nowadays no new development in science can be compared to the breakthrough into atomic energy in the 1940s. Atomic espionage was almost as valuable to us in the political and diplomatic spheres as it was in the military. When Fuchs reported the unpublished design of the bomb, he also provided key data on the production of uranium 235. Fuchs revealed that American production was one hundred kilograms of U-235 a month and twenty kilos of plutonium per month. This was of the highest importance, because from this information we could calculate the number of atomic hombs possessed by the Americans. Thus, we were able to determine that the United States was not prepared for a nuclear war with us at the end of the 1940s or even in the early 1950s. This information might be compared with Colonel Oleg Penkovsky's information to the Americans during the early 1960s on the size of the Soviet ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) arsenal. Just as Fuchs enabled us to determine that the United States was not ready for nuclear war against the Soviet Union, Penkovsky told the United States that Khrushchev was not prepared for nuclear war against the United States.

Stalin pursued a tough policy of confrontation against the United States when the Cold War started; he knew he did not have to be afraid of the American nuclear threat, at least until the end of the 1940s. Only by 1955 did we estimate the stockpile of American and British nuclear weapons to be sufficient to destroy the Soviet Union.

That information helped to assure a Communist victory in China's civil war in 1947-1948. We were aware that President Harry Truman was seriously considering the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a Chinese Communist victory. Then Stalin initiated the Berlin crisis, blockading the Western-controlled sectors of the city in 1948. Western press reports indicated that Truman and Clement Attlee, the British prime minister, were prepared to use nuclear weapons to prevent Berlin's fall to communism, but we knew that the Americans did not have enough nuclear weapons to deal with both Berlin and China. The American government overestimated our threat in Berlin and lost the opportunity to use the nuclear threat to support the Chinese nationalists.

Stalin provoked the Berlin crisis deliberately to divert attention from the crucial struggle for power in China. In 1951, when we were discussing plans for military operations against American bases, Molotov told me that our position in Berlin helped the Chinese Communists. For Stalin, the Chinese Communist victory supported his policy of confrontation with America. He was preoccupied with the idea of a Sino-Soviet axis against the Western world. Stalin's view of Mao Tse-tung, of course, was that he was a junior partner. I remember that when Mao came to Moscow in 1950 Stalin treated him with respect, but as a junior partner.

In August 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic device. This event, for which we had worked a decade, was not announced in the Soviet press; therefore, when the American media announced our explosion on September 23, Stalin and the Soviet security establishment were shocked. Our immediate reaction was that there had been an American agent penetration of our test; but in a week our scientists reported that nuclear explosions in the atmosphere could be easily detected by planes sampling air around Soviet borders. This scientific explanation relieved us of the burden of proving there was no mole among us.

Kurchatov and Beria were honored by the government for outstanding contributions and services in strengthening the might of the country. They received medals, monetary awards, and certificates granting them lifetime status as honored citizens. Free travel, dachas, and the right of their children to enter higher education establishments without exams were granted for life to all key scientific personnel on the project.

In assessing all the materials that were processed by Department S, we must take into account the views of Academician Yuli Khariton and Academician Anatoli P. Aleksandrov, president of the Academy of Sciences, who said that Kurchatov (1903-1960) was a genius who had made no major mistakes in the design of our first atomic bomb. They made their comments on the eighty-fifth anniversary of Kurchatov's ~birthday, in 1988. They noted that Kurchatov, having in his possession only several micrograms of artificially produced plutonium, was brave knough to suggest the immediate construction of major facilities to refine plutonium. The Soviet bomb was constructed in three years. Without the intelligence contribution, there could have been no Soviet atomic bomb that quickly. For me, Kurchatov remains a genius, the Russian Oppenheimer, but not a scientific giant like Bohr or Fermi. He was certainly helped by the intelligence we supplied, and his efforts would have been for naught without Beria's talent in mobilizing the nation's resources.

Stalin, Mao and the beginning of the Korean War

This is an excerpt from the extraordinary book Mao: The Unknown Story by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday

At the end of World War II, Korea, which had been annexed by Japan early in the century, was divided across the middle, along the 38th Parallel, with Russia occupying the northern half and the US the South. After formal independence in 1948, the North came under a Communist dictator, Kim Il Sung. In March 1949, as Mao's armies were rolling towards victory, Kim went to Moscow to try to persuade Stalin to help him seize the South. Stalin said "No," as this might involve confronting America. Kim then turned to Mao, and one month later sent his deputy defense minister to China. Mao gave Kim a firm commitment, saying he would be glad to help Pyongyang attack the South, but could they wait until he had taken the whole of China: "It would be much better if the North Korean government launched an all-out attack against the South in the first half of 1950..." Mao said, adding emphatically: "If necessary, we can stealthily put in Chinese soldiers for you." Koreans and Chinese, he said, had black hair, and the Americans would not be able to tell the difference: "They will not notice."
Mao encouraged Pyongyang to invade the South and take on the USA - and volunteered Chinese manpower - as early as May 1949. At this stage he was talking about sending in Chinese troops clandestinely, posing as Koreans, and not about China having an open collision with America. During his visit to Russia, however, Mao changed. He became determined to fight America openly - because only such a war enable him to gouge out of Stalin what he needed to build his own world-class war machine. What Mao had in mind boiled down to a deal: Chinese soldiers would fight the Americans for Stalin in exchange for Soviet technology and equipment.
Stalin received reports from both his ambassador in Korea and his liaison with Mao about Mao's eagerness to have a war in Korea. As a result of this new factor, Stalin began to reconsider his previous refusal to let Kim invade the South.
Stalin was given a push by Kim.On 19 January 1950, the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang, Terentii Shtykov, reported Kim had told him, "excitedly" that "now that China is completing its liberation," South Korea's was "next in line." Kim "thinks that he needs to visit comrade Stalin again, in order to receive instruction and authorization to launch an offensive." Kim added that "if it was not possible to meet comrade Stalin now, he will try to meet with Mao." He stressed that Mao had "promised to render him assistance after the conclusion of the war in China." Playing "the Mao card," Kim told Shtykov that "he also has other questions for Mao Tse-tung, in particular the question of the possibility of setting up an Eastern bureau of the Cominform" (no mention of talking to Stalin about this). Mao, he said "would have instructions on all issues." Kim was telling Stalin that Mao was keen to give him military support, and that if Stalin would still not endorse an invasion, he (Kim) would go to Mao direct and place himself under Mao.
Eleven days later, on 30 January, Stalin wired Shtykov to tell Kim that he was "prepared to help him on this." This is the first documented evidence of Stalin agreeing to start a war in Korea, and he shifted his position because of Mao, who possessed the critical asset - an inexhaustible supply of men. When Kim came to Moscow two months later, Stalin said that the international environment had "changed sufficiently to permit a more active stance on the unification of Korea." He went on to make it explicit that this was because "the Chinese were now in a position to devote more attention to the Korean issue." There was "one vital condition - Peking's support" for the war. Kim "must rely on Mao, who understands Asian affairs beautifully."
A war in Korea fought by Chinese and Koreans would give the Soviet Union incalculable advantages: it could field-test both its own new equipment, especially its MiG jets, and America's technology, as well as acquiring some of this technology, along with valuable intelligence on America. Both China and Korea would be completely dependent on Russian arms, so Stalin could fine-tune the degree of Russia's involvement. Moreover, he could test how far America would go in a war with the Communist camp.
But for Stalin, the greatest attraction of a war in Korea was that the Chinese, with their massive numbers, which Mao was eager to use, might be able to eliminate, and in any case tie down, so many American troops that the balance of power might tilt in Stalin's favor and enable him to turn his schemes into reality. These schemes included seizing various European countries, among them Germany, Spain and Italy. One scenario Stalin discussed during the Korean War was an air attack on the US fleet on the high seas between Japan and Korea (en route to Inchon, in September 1950). In fact, Stalin told Mao o 5 October 1950 that the period provided a unique - and short-lived - window of opportunity because two of the major capitalist states, Germany and Japan, were out of action militarily. Discussing the possibility of what amounted to a Third World War, Stalin said: "Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should not ... If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years' time..."
Mao repeatedly spelled out this potential to Stalin, as a way of stressing his usefulness. On 1 July 1950, within a week of the North invading the South, and long before Chinese troops had gone in, he had Chou tell the Russian ambassador: "Now we must energetically build up our aviation and fleet," adding pointedly for Stalin's ears: so as to deal a knockout blow... to the armed forces of the USA." On 19 August Mao himself told Stalin's emissary, Yudin, that America could send in thirty to forty divisions but that Chinese troops could "grind" these up. He reiterated this message to Yudin a week later. Then, on 1 March 1951, he summed up his overall plan for the Korean War to Stalin in chilling language: "to spend several years consuming several hundred thousand American lives."
With Mao's expendables on offer, Stalin positively disired a war with the West in Korea. When Kim invaded the South on 25 June 1950, the UN Security Council quickly passed a resolution committing troops to support South Korea. Stalin's ambassador to the UN, Yakov Malik, had been boycotting proceedings since January, ostensibly over Taiwan continuing to occupy China's seat. Everyone expected Malik, who remained in New York, to return to the chamber and veto the resolution, but he stayed away. Malik had in fact requested permission to return to the Security Council, but Stalin rang him up and told him to stay out. The Soviet failure to exercise its veto power has perplexed observers ever since, as it seemed a golden opportunity to block the West's involvement in Korea. But if Stalin decided not to use his veto, it can only have been for one reason: that he did not want to keep Western forces out. He wanted them in,where Mao's sheer weight of numbers could grind them up.

... Because of the enormous ramifications of taking on the USA, Stalin decided to keep an extra degree of control. He had to make absolutely sure that Kim understood that he, Stalin, was the ultimate boss before he put Kim in Mao's hands. So even thoughMao was in Moscow on 30 January, when Stalin gave Kim consent to go to war, he did not breathe a word to Mao, and ordered Kim not to inform the Chinese. Stalin brought Kim to Moscow only at the end of March, after Mao had left. Stalin went over battle plans in detail with Kim, and at theirr last talk, in April 1950, he laid it on the line to Kim: "If you should get kicked in the teeth, I shall not lift a finger. You have to ask Mao for help." With this comradely envoi, Kim was waved away to Mao's care.
On 13 May a Russian plane flew Kim to Peking. He went straight to Mao to announce that Stalin had given the go-ahead. At 11:30 that night, Chou was dispatched to ask the Soviet ambassador, Roshchin, to get Moscow's conformation. Stalin's stilted message came the next morning: "North Korea can move toward actions; however, this question should be discussed... personally with comrade Mao." Next day (15 May), Mao gave Kim his full commitment, and on the most vital issue: "if the Americans were to take part... [China] would assist North Korea with its own troops." He went out of his way to exclude the participation od Russian troops, saying that: "Since the Soviet Union is bound by a demarcation agreement on the 38th Parallel [dividing Korea] with America, it would be 'inconvenient' [for it] to take part in military actions [but as] China is not bound by any such obligations, it can therefore fully render assistance to the northerners." Mao offered to deploy troops on the Korean border.
Mao endorsed the Kim-Stalin plan, and Stalin wired consent on the 16th. On 25 June the North Korean army smashed across the 38th Parallel. Mao, it seems, was not told the launch day. Kim wanted Chinese troops kept out until they were absolutely needed. Stalin, too, wanted them in only when America committed large numbers of troops for the Chinese to "consume."

Sunday, August 29, 2010

Singapore and other Asian countries were saved from communism by the Vietnam War

Lee Kuan Yew, who led Singapore to independence and served as its first prime minister, writes in his autobiography

Although American intervention failed in Vietnam, it bought time for the rest of Southeast Asia. In 1965, when the US military moved massively into South Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines faced internal threats from armed communist insurgencies . . . and the communist underground was still active in Singapore. . . America's action [in Vietnam] enabled non-communist Southeast Asia to put their own houses in order. By 1975, they were in better shape to stand up to the communists. Had there been no US intervention, the will of these countries to resist them would have melted and Southeast Asia would most likely have gone communist. The prosperous emerging market economies of ASEAN were nurtured during the Vietnam War years.

Wednesday, August 25, 2010

Tom Hayden's pre-DNC'68 record of Treason

As presented to the House Un-American Activities Committee by the committee's counsel

Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, the committee files contain considerable information on the Newark Community Union Project founder, Tom Hayden. Permission is requested to read into the record at this time a summary of the highlights of Hayden's career based on the information in the committee's files.

The Chairman. That suggestion is welcome.

Mr. Smith. Hayden, a founder of the Students for a Democratic Society, served as one of the organization's field representatives in 1961 and 1962. During this period he worked with SNCC, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, in Alabama and Mississippi.

The Chairman. That is the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee? I think it is a misnomer. I think it should be "Nonstudent Violence Coordinating Committee."

Mr. Smith. Based on this experience, he subsequently wrote a pamphlet published by SDS entitled "Revolution in Mississippi."

Hayden has made a number of trips abroad in the past several years.

In 1962 he was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Communist organized and controlled Eighth World Youth Festival which was held in Helsinki, Finland.

In December 1965, in violation of State Department regulations, Hayden traveled to North Vietnam and Communist China with Communist Party theoretician Herbert Aptheker and former Yale professor Staughton Lynd. The three met with Asian revolutionary leaders in Hanoi, Peking, and also in Prague, Czechoslovakia. Before returning to the United States on January 7, 1966, they also visited Moscow.

Following this trip, Hayden wrote the foreword to the book Mission to Hanoi, which was written by Herbert Aptheker. In addition, Hayden collaborated with Staughton Lynd in writing another book on the trip entitled The Other Side. This book, published in January 1967, depicts the Viet Cong as heroes and warmly praises the Communist leaders of North Vietnam. It also tells about some of the brutality inflicted on the Vietnamese people by the Communists, but excuses it as "a 'necessary' part of resistance against the greater evil of foreign attack and rule," to use the words of the pro-Viet Cong Viet Report.

In April 1967 Hayden visited Puerto Rico as a member of a fact-finding group whose trip was arranged by the Tri-Continental Information Center.

The Tri-Continental Information Center is a relatively new Communist-supported organization, set up in the spring of 1967, with its headquarters in New York City. Part of its program is to "combat and debilitate U.S. foreign policy."

While in Puerto Rico as an agent of the Tri-Continental Information Center, Hayden took part in an islandwide march which was held on April 16, 1967.

The purpose of this march was to protest the drafting of Puerto Ricans for service in Vietnam and also to oppose a forthcoming plebiscite in which most Puerto Ricans were expected to – and actually did – endorse continuation of the island's commonwealth relationship with the United States.

This demonstration was sponsored by the Movimiento Pro Independencia [de Puerto Rico], MPI, which FBI Director Hoover has described as the largest and most influential of Puerto Rican proindependence groups and a consistent supporter of Castro's government in Cuba.

The MPI maintains a "mission" in Havana. MPI delegations also attended two recent Havana conferences aimed at encouraging Communist revolutions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

They were the Tricontinental Conference held in January 1966 and the First Conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization, which convened in July 1967. At the latter conference, the MPI spokesman favored more concrete expressions of solidarity with Communist guerrillas actively engaged in efforts to overthrow four Latin American governments. He also stated that the MPI would continue to show its solidarity with Communists fighting to overthrow the South Vietnamese Government by continuation of an MPI campaign of resistance to the draft of Puerto Ricans into the U.S. Armed Forces.

In September 1967 Hayden was one of a group of approximately 40 U.S. citizens who traveled to Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, to meet with representatives of the Viet Cong and the Communist government of North Vietnam.

As a result of contacts made at that meeting, he traveled to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in November 1967, where three U.S. POW's were turned over to him. He brought the three back to the United States, where they were taken into custody by military authorities.

Hayden's most recent trip abroad was undertaken in January of this year, when he went to Havana, Cuba, to take part in the International Cultural Congress held there January 4 to 11 to discuss problems of the "third world," which Communist and other revolutionaries expect will destroy non-Communist governments in the years ahead.