"As for the enemies of freedom, those who are potential adversaries, they will be reminded that peace is the highest aspiration of the American people. We will negotiate for it, sacrifice for it; we will not surrender for it, now or ever." - Reagan, January 20, 1981

"In Vietnam, we tried and failed in a just cause. No More Vietnams can mean we will not try again. It should mean we will not fail again." - from No More Vietnams by Richard Nixon

Sunday, August 29, 2010

Singapore and other Asian countries were saved from communism by the Vietnam War

Lee Kuan Yew, who led Singapore to independence and served as its first prime minister, writes in his autobiography

Although American intervention failed in Vietnam, it bought time for the rest of Southeast Asia. In 1965, when the US military moved massively into South Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines faced internal threats from armed communist insurgencies . . . and the communist underground was still active in Singapore. . . America's action [in Vietnam] enabled non-communist Southeast Asia to put their own houses in order. By 1975, they were in better shape to stand up to the communists. Had there been no US intervention, the will of these countries to resist them would have melted and Southeast Asia would most likely have gone communist. The prosperous emerging market economies of ASEAN were nurtured during the Vietnam War years.

Wednesday, August 25, 2010

Tom Hayden's pre-DNC'68 record of Treason

As presented to the House Un-American Activities Committee by the committee's counsel

Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, the committee files contain considerable information on the Newark Community Union Project founder, Tom Hayden. Permission is requested to read into the record at this time a summary of the highlights of Hayden's career based on the information in the committee's files.

The Chairman. That suggestion is welcome.

Mr. Smith. Hayden, a founder of the Students for a Democratic Society, served as one of the organization's field representatives in 1961 and 1962. During this period he worked with SNCC, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, in Alabama and Mississippi.

The Chairman. That is the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee? I think it is a misnomer. I think it should be "Nonstudent Violence Coordinating Committee."

Mr. Smith. Based on this experience, he subsequently wrote a pamphlet published by SDS entitled "Revolution in Mississippi."

Hayden has made a number of trips abroad in the past several years.

In 1962 he was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Communist organized and controlled Eighth World Youth Festival which was held in Helsinki, Finland.

In December 1965, in violation of State Department regulations, Hayden traveled to North Vietnam and Communist China with Communist Party theoretician Herbert Aptheker and former Yale professor Staughton Lynd. The three met with Asian revolutionary leaders in Hanoi, Peking, and also in Prague, Czechoslovakia. Before returning to the United States on January 7, 1966, they also visited Moscow.

Following this trip, Hayden wrote the foreword to the book Mission to Hanoi, which was written by Herbert Aptheker. In addition, Hayden collaborated with Staughton Lynd in writing another book on the trip entitled The Other Side. This book, published in January 1967, depicts the Viet Cong as heroes and warmly praises the Communist leaders of North Vietnam. It also tells about some of the brutality inflicted on the Vietnamese people by the Communists, but excuses it as "a 'necessary' part of resistance against the greater evil of foreign attack and rule," to use the words of the pro-Viet Cong Viet Report.

In April 1967 Hayden visited Puerto Rico as a member of a fact-finding group whose trip was arranged by the Tri-Continental Information Center.

The Tri-Continental Information Center is a relatively new Communist-supported organization, set up in the spring of 1967, with its headquarters in New York City. Part of its program is to "combat and debilitate U.S. foreign policy."

While in Puerto Rico as an agent of the Tri-Continental Information Center, Hayden took part in an islandwide march which was held on April 16, 1967.

The purpose of this march was to protest the drafting of Puerto Ricans for service in Vietnam and also to oppose a forthcoming plebiscite in which most Puerto Ricans were expected to – and actually did – endorse continuation of the island's commonwealth relationship with the United States.

This demonstration was sponsored by the Movimiento Pro Independencia [de Puerto Rico], MPI, which FBI Director Hoover has described as the largest and most influential of Puerto Rican proindependence groups and a consistent supporter of Castro's government in Cuba.

The MPI maintains a "mission" in Havana. MPI delegations also attended two recent Havana conferences aimed at encouraging Communist revolutions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

They were the Tricontinental Conference held in January 1966 and the First Conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization, which convened in July 1967. At the latter conference, the MPI spokesman favored more concrete expressions of solidarity with Communist guerrillas actively engaged in efforts to overthrow four Latin American governments. He also stated that the MPI would continue to show its solidarity with Communists fighting to overthrow the South Vietnamese Government by continuation of an MPI campaign of resistance to the draft of Puerto Ricans into the U.S. Armed Forces.

In September 1967 Hayden was one of a group of approximately 40 U.S. citizens who traveled to Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, to meet with representatives of the Viet Cong and the Communist government of North Vietnam.

As a result of contacts made at that meeting, he traveled to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in November 1967, where three U.S. POW's were turned over to him. He brought the three back to the United States, where they were taken into custody by military authorities.

Hayden's most recent trip abroad was undertaken in January of this year, when he went to Havana, Cuba, to take part in the International Cultural Congress held there January 4 to 11 to discuss problems of the "third world," which Communist and other revolutionaries expect will destroy non-Communist governments in the years ahead.

Saturday, August 21, 2010

Documented German support for the Communist-Bolshiviks during the 1917 Russian Provisional Government

German Foreign Office Documents on Financial Support to the Bolsheviks in 1917
Author(s): George Katkov
Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr., 1956), pp. 181-189
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2625787


Mr. Katkov's article says "The message was addressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron R. von Kuhlmann, to an official who was to communicate its content orally to the Kaiser." - a separate reply document dated 4th December 1917 states "His Majesty the Kaiser has expressed his agreement with Your Excellency's expose concerning a possible rapprochement with Russia."

BERLIN, 3rd December I9I7.

Add A3 4486.
Tel. Hughes I.Z.
To Tel. No. I77I

The disruption of the Entente and the subsequent creation of political combinations agreeable to us constitute the most important war aim of our diplomacy. Russia appeared (to me)1 to be the weakest link in the enemy's chain. The task therefore was gradually to loosen it and, when possible, to remove it. This was the purpose of the subversive activity we caused to be carried out in Russia behind the front-in the first place (vigorcus)1 promotion of separatist tendencies and support of the Bolsheviki. It was not until the Bolsheviki had received from us a steady flow of funds through various channels and under varying labels that they were in a position to be able to build up their main organ, Pravda, to conduct energetic propaganda 2 and appreciably to extend the originally narrow basis of their party. The Bolsheviki have now come into power; how long they will retain power cannot yet be foreseen. They need peace in order to strengthen their own position; on the other hand it is entirely in our interest that we should exploit the period while they are in power, which maybe a short one, in order to attain firstly an armistice and then, if possible, peace.3 The conclusion of a separate peace would mean the achievement of the desired war aim, namely, a breach between Russia and her Allies. The amount of tension necessarily caused by such a breach would determine the degree of Russia's dependence on Germany and her future relations with us. Once cast out and cast off by her former Allies, abandoned financially, Russia will be forced to seek our support. We shall be able to provide help forRussia in various ways; firstly in the rehabilitation of the railways; (I have in mind a German-Russian Commission-under our control-which would undertake the rational and coordinated exploitation of the railway lines so as to ensure speedy resumption of freight movement) then the provision of a substantial loan, which Russia requires to maintain her state machine. This could take the form of an advance on the security of grain, raw materials, etc., etc., to be provided by Russia and shipped under the control of the above-mentioned Commission. Aid on such a basis-the scope to be increased as and when necessary-would in my opinion bring about a growing rapprochement between the two countries. Austria-Hungary will regard the rapprochement with distrust and not without apprehension. I would interpret the excessive eagerness of Count Czernin to come to terms with the Russians as a desire to forestall us and to prevent Germany and Russia arriving at an intimate relationship in convenient to the Danube Monarchy. There is no need for us to compete for Russia's good will. We are strong enough to wait with equanimity; we are in a far better position than Austria-Hungary to offer Russia what she needs for the reconstruction of her State. I view future developments in the East with confidence but I think it expedient for the time being to maintain a certain reserve in our attitude to the Austro- Hungarian Government in all matters including the Polish question which concern both monarchies so as to preserve a free hand for all eventualities. The above-mentioned considerations lie, I venture to believe, within the framework of the directives given me by His Majesty. I request you to report to His Majesty accordingly and to transmit to me by telegram the All-highest instructions.

St. S.
K.

1 Crossed out in the original.
2 The words 'to conduct energetic propaganda' written on the margin and inserted in the text.
3 An asterisk in the original text refersto a hand written marginal note saying: 'There is no question of supporting
the Bolsheviki in the future'. It remains doubtful whether these words were included in the text as telegraphed or whether they are of a later date.

Leftists and the Gulf of Tonkin

I'm so sick of the left's celebratory tin-foil hat "it was staged" conspiracy theories with the USS Maddox. To vent my frustrations, I'm going to make it as simple as possible.

Short story by Phillip Jennings (served in Vietnam with the United States Marine Corps, flying helicopters, and in Laos as a pilot for Air America. A successful entrepreneur, he is currently CEO of Molecular Resonance Corporation, which is developing technology to detect and disarm Improvised Explosive Devices) -

On August 2, 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the American destroyer USS Maddox in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. Two days later, August 4, another attack was initially reported, though it is now clear that the USS Maddox and USS C. Turner Joy misread their sonar data, believed they were under torpedo attack when in fact they weren’t, and responded with a barrage that hit nothing but water. In response to the first and suspected second attacks, Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Commander in Chief of the Pacific, requested that he be allowed to retaliate against North Vietnam. President Johnson agreed, ordering retaliatory strikes by the 7th Fleet naval forces. On August 5, 1964, aircraft from the carriers USS Ticonderoga and USS Constellation destroyed an oil storage facility at Vinh and damaged or sank about thirty North Vietnamese patrol boats in port or along the coast.


Video explanation, by McNamara (Secretary of Defense for JFK/LBJ) -

More by McNamara and genocidal Communist puppet Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap (see green-highlighted section below for the actual reason for America's defense of democratic South Vietnam)


Long Story by Robert F. Turner (taught undergraduate and graduate seminars on the Vietnam War at the University of Virginia for many years. He wrote the 1975 book "Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development." He served twice in Vietnam as an Army officer) -
Reassessing the causes
Sunday, August 2, 2009

Today marks the 45th anniversary of a 1964 attack by North Vietnamese P-4 torpedo boats upon the American destroyer USS Maddox in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. The incident remains shrouded by confusion and misinformation and continues to be misperceived by many as the reason America went to war in Vietnam. Today may be a useful time to set the record straight.

First, contrary to popular belief, the Aug. 2 attack definitely did occur. No less an authority than Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap -- North Vietnam's defense minister at the time -- admitted so in a 1995 meeting with former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara.

Nor is there a scintilla of evidence that President Johnson sought to provoke North Vietnam so he could take America to war. On the contrary, Mr. Johnson's focus was on his domestic Great Society programs. His primary concern about Vietnam was that the war not be lost on his watch. Indeed, he was under considerable pressure from Congress and public opinion to respond more firmly to growing communist aggression in South Vietnam.

There remains uncertainty about why the Aug. 2 attack occurred -- Hanoi may have associated the presence of the Maddox off its coast with a series of covert CIA naval operations far to the south and involving South Vietnamese assets. If so, that clearly was not the intention of the Johnson administration or the U.S. military.

It now seems clear that reports of a second attack, on Aug. 4, 1964, were mistaken -- largely a product of "freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen," as the ship's skipper would conclude later. It also seems clear that there was a midlevel "coverup" at the National Security Agency when it was discovered that communications intercepts on Aug. 4 had been mistranslated -- which may have contributed to the confusion about a second attack.

One of the greatest myths of the Vietnam War is that America went to war because of the reported "incidents" in the Gulf of Tonkin in early August 1964. It is true that on Aug. 7 Congress enacted a statute by a combined vote of 504-2 (99.6 percent approval) that Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright, in answer to a question from another senator during the floor debate, agreed would authorize the president to "use such force as could lead into war." But the resolution noted that "these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors," and it authorized the president "to take all necessary measures, including the use of armed force, to assist any ... protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

Those "protocol states" were South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia -- countries we had solemnly pledged to defend by treaty and that the president had been authorized to defend by an almost unanimous Congress. Yet when President Nixon sent U.S. forces across the Cambodian border in 1970 to attack North Vietnamese and Viet Cong supply areas, congressional liberals and "peace" activists insisted there was no legal authority to use force in Cambodia.

It was not until May 1984 that Hanoi publicly confirmed the decision that really started the Vietnam War. A cover story in the English-language monthly Vietnam Courier detailed the "absolute secret" decision made by the Lao Dong Party on May 19, 1959 -- more than five years before the Gulf of Tonkin incident -- to open the Ho Chi Minh Trail and start sending tens of thousands of troops and countless tons of military equipment into South Vietnam to overthrow its government. It was to stop the communist takeover of South Vietnam by force that America went to war, just as we did in 1950 to protect South Korea.


By preventing a communist military victory in South Vietnam for more than a decade, we bought time for Thailand, Indonesia and other potential targets to become stronger. While we were doing that, China -- which in 1965 had been supporting guerrilla movements in Indochina, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and as far away as Mozambique in Africa -- went through an internal upheaval called the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. By 1971, China was no longer in the business of exporting revolution. Had America walked away from Indochina in 1965, things might have worked out very differently.

Many scholars today argue that under Gen. Creighton Abrams Jr. the war in South Vietnam had been virtually won by the spring offensive of 1972, when South Vietnamese forces held their own against all Hanoi could throw against them with only American air power for support. The Viet Cong already had been destroyed as an effective fighting force in South Vietnam, with all major battles being fought by uniformed North Vietnamese regulars.

But Congress and the American people were tired of the war, and in May 1973, Congress enacted a new law making it illegal for the president to spend money for U.S. combat operations anywhere in Indochina.

America threw in the towel and, in the eyes of many experts, snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. Hanoi sent virtually its entire army behind columns of Soviet-made tanks to conquer its neighbors, and in the first three years after the communist victory, more people were killed in Indochina than had died in combat during the previous 14 years.

The Yale University Cambodia Genocide Project estimated that in tiny Cambodia alone, 1.8 million human beings -- more than 20 percent of the country's population -- were slaughtered by the communist victors.

Was going to war in Vietnam a wise decision in retrospect? Was it worth the price? Honest people differ. But one thing the Vietnam War clearly was not. It was not a consequence of a minor little misunderstanding in the Gulf of Tonkin 45 years ago today.