"As for the enemies of freedom, those who are potential adversaries, they will be reminded that peace is the highest aspiration of the American people. We will negotiate for it, sacrifice for it; we will not surrender for it, now or ever." - Reagan, January 20, 1981

"In Vietnam, we tried and failed in a just cause. No More Vietnams can mean we will not try again. It should mean we will not fail again." - from No More Vietnams by Richard Nixon

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

In 1957, Communist Che parroted a CPUSA Stalinist hack's propaganda about the 1956 Hungarian Revolution; the CP Stalinist later admitted he was lying



In 1957, while Che was in the mountains in Cuba

Che defended the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. The Soviets suppressed the revolt by freedom fighters in Hungary. If Che was truly on the side of the oppressed, he would’ve supported the Hungarian revolts and opposed the Soviet invasion. But that wasn’t the case. During his time as a “fighter” in the July 26th movement, which was led by Fidel Castro, the future totalitarian Communist dictator of Cuba, Che defended the Soviet invasion of Hungary. His defense of the Soviet invasion got him into a real heated fight with another member of the July 26th movement. How can we know that? Humberto Fontova, the author of the eye-opening book “Exposing the real Che Guevara and the useful idiots who idolize him”, had an interview with that member’s brother on the fight between him and Che. Page 46 of his book even stated what the member’s brother said.

In that fight, Che called the Hungarian rebels “Fascists” and “CIA agents”. He stated that the Soviets had a duty to invade Hungary and to oppress the freedom fighters who sought freedom and independence. That was just a small taste of what Che Guevara was “fighting” for ["Fought" and "fighting" are in quotation marks because Che wasn't a real Guerrilla fighter, but a coward who loved killing innocent people off the battlefield].


This is telling because in that same year Communist Party USA's leading Stalinist theorist, and incestuous pedophile, Herbert Aptheker "wrote a defense of the Soviet invasion [a book called "The Truth About Hungary"], claiming that Hungarians rejoiced when they saw the Soviet tanks rolling into their nation" and vilified Hungarian freedom fighters as fascists.

This is telling because they knew it was a lie, and they didn't care. See the following post on a historical forum from historian and ex-Communist Ron Radosh

Subject: Aptheker's "The Truth about Hungary" (Radosh)

Re Mark Kramer's incisive comments on Aptheker's "The Truth About Hungary." Decades ago, when Aptheker and I were still talking, I asked him about the book. He replied: "I had a job to do for the Party, and I did it." It was as simple as that.

I would also mention that right after he wrote the book, the Trotskyist Shane Mage authored a pamphlet "The Truth About Herbert Aptheker's 'The Truth About Hungary,'" which dissected the methodology in a devastating fashion. And during the rebellion itself, many Communists could learn the truth about the rebellion from the dispatches from Hungary by Peter Freyer, the British Daily Worker's correspondent. Freyer could not but help see, since he was on the scene, that this was a working-class rebellion against Stalinism, and not a fascist coup that the Soviets were putting down.

Ron Radosh

Tuesday, September 7, 2010

The Berlin blockage of 1948-1949 was a diversion from the communist takeover of China

According to Former Soviet deputy spy-chief Pavel Sudoplatov

The information [Atomic spy Klaus] Fuchs gave us in 1948 coincided with [British diplomate and Soviet agent Donald] Maclean's reports from Washington on America's limited nuclear potential, not sufficient to wage an all-out and prolonged war. Maclean had become first secretary and acting head of chancery at the British Embassy in 1944.

Looking back, one may say that in every scientific team, both in the Soviet Union and in the United States, there were politically motivated figures, Kurchatov in the Soviet Union, Edward Teller in America. Kurchatov always kept the interests of the state first in his mind. He was less stubborn and less independent than men like Kapitsa or loffe. Beria, Pervukhin, and Stalin immediately sensed that he was different from the scientists of the older generation; they saw that he was young, ambitious, and fully prepared to subordinate academic traditions to the interests of the state. When the government wanted to speed up the test of our first atomic bomb in 1949, Kurchatov went along with copying the American design. However, parallel work continued on the Soviet-designed bomb, which was exploded in 1951. In the United States, Edward Teller assumed a similar role later, when he was put in charge of the hydrogen bomb project.

Oppenheimer reminded me very much of our classic scientists who tried to maintain their own identity, their own world, and their total internal independence. It was a peculiar independence and an illusion, because both Kurchatov and Oppenheimer were destined to be not only scientists but also directors of huge government-sponsored projects. The conflict was inevitable; we cannot judge them, because the bomb marked the opening of a new era in science, when for the first time in history scientists were required to act as statesmen. Initially neither Oppenheimer nor Kurchatov was surrounded by the scientific bureaucracies that later emerged in the 1950s. In the 1940s, neither government was in a position to control and influence scientific progress, because there was no way to progress except to rely on a group of geniuses and adjust to their needs, demands, and extravagant behavior. Nowadays no new development in science can be compared to the breakthrough into atomic energy in the 1940s. Atomic espionage was almost as valuable to us in the political and diplomatic spheres as it was in the military. When Fuchs reported the unpublished design of the bomb, he also provided key data on the production of uranium 235. Fuchs revealed that American production was one hundred kilograms of U-235 a month and twenty kilos of plutonium per month. This was of the highest importance, because from this information we could calculate the number of atomic hombs possessed by the Americans. Thus, we were able to determine that the United States was not prepared for a nuclear war with us at the end of the 1940s or even in the early 1950s. This information might be compared with Colonel Oleg Penkovsky's information to the Americans during the early 1960s on the size of the Soviet ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) arsenal. Just as Fuchs enabled us to determine that the United States was not ready for nuclear war against the Soviet Union, Penkovsky told the United States that Khrushchev was not prepared for nuclear war against the United States.

Stalin pursued a tough policy of confrontation against the United States when the Cold War started; he knew he did not have to be afraid of the American nuclear threat, at least until the end of the 1940s. Only by 1955 did we estimate the stockpile of American and British nuclear weapons to be sufficient to destroy the Soviet Union.

That information helped to assure a Communist victory in China's civil war in 1947-1948. We were aware that President Harry Truman was seriously considering the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a Chinese Communist victory. Then Stalin initiated the Berlin crisis, blockading the Western-controlled sectors of the city in 1948. Western press reports indicated that Truman and Clement Attlee, the British prime minister, were prepared to use nuclear weapons to prevent Berlin's fall to communism, but we knew that the Americans did not have enough nuclear weapons to deal with both Berlin and China. The American government overestimated our threat in Berlin and lost the opportunity to use the nuclear threat to support the Chinese nationalists.

Stalin provoked the Berlin crisis deliberately to divert attention from the crucial struggle for power in China. In 1951, when we were discussing plans for military operations against American bases, Molotov told me that our position in Berlin helped the Chinese Communists. For Stalin, the Chinese Communist victory supported his policy of confrontation with America. He was preoccupied with the idea of a Sino-Soviet axis against the Western world. Stalin's view of Mao Tse-tung, of course, was that he was a junior partner. I remember that when Mao came to Moscow in 1950 Stalin treated him with respect, but as a junior partner.

In August 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic device. This event, for which we had worked a decade, was not announced in the Soviet press; therefore, when the American media announced our explosion on September 23, Stalin and the Soviet security establishment were shocked. Our immediate reaction was that there had been an American agent penetration of our test; but in a week our scientists reported that nuclear explosions in the atmosphere could be easily detected by planes sampling air around Soviet borders. This scientific explanation relieved us of the burden of proving there was no mole among us.

Kurchatov and Beria were honored by the government for outstanding contributions and services in strengthening the might of the country. They received medals, monetary awards, and certificates granting them lifetime status as honored citizens. Free travel, dachas, and the right of their children to enter higher education establishments without exams were granted for life to all key scientific personnel on the project.

In assessing all the materials that were processed by Department S, we must take into account the views of Academician Yuli Khariton and Academician Anatoli P. Aleksandrov, president of the Academy of Sciences, who said that Kurchatov (1903-1960) was a genius who had made no major mistakes in the design of our first atomic bomb. They made their comments on the eighty-fifth anniversary of Kurchatov's ~birthday, in 1988. They noted that Kurchatov, having in his possession only several micrograms of artificially produced plutonium, was brave knough to suggest the immediate construction of major facilities to refine plutonium. The Soviet bomb was constructed in three years. Without the intelligence contribution, there could have been no Soviet atomic bomb that quickly. For me, Kurchatov remains a genius, the Russian Oppenheimer, but not a scientific giant like Bohr or Fermi. He was certainly helped by the intelligence we supplied, and his efforts would have been for naught without Beria's talent in mobilizing the nation's resources.

Stalin, Mao and the beginning of the Korean War

This is an excerpt from the extraordinary book Mao: The Unknown Story by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday

At the end of World War II, Korea, which had been annexed by Japan early in the century, was divided across the middle, along the 38th Parallel, with Russia occupying the northern half and the US the South. After formal independence in 1948, the North came under a Communist dictator, Kim Il Sung. In March 1949, as Mao's armies were rolling towards victory, Kim went to Moscow to try to persuade Stalin to help him seize the South. Stalin said "No," as this might involve confronting America. Kim then turned to Mao, and one month later sent his deputy defense minister to China. Mao gave Kim a firm commitment, saying he would be glad to help Pyongyang attack the South, but could they wait until he had taken the whole of China: "It would be much better if the North Korean government launched an all-out attack against the South in the first half of 1950..." Mao said, adding emphatically: "If necessary, we can stealthily put in Chinese soldiers for you." Koreans and Chinese, he said, had black hair, and the Americans would not be able to tell the difference: "They will not notice."
Mao encouraged Pyongyang to invade the South and take on the USA - and volunteered Chinese manpower - as early as May 1949. At this stage he was talking about sending in Chinese troops clandestinely, posing as Koreans, and not about China having an open collision with America. During his visit to Russia, however, Mao changed. He became determined to fight America openly - because only such a war enable him to gouge out of Stalin what he needed to build his own world-class war machine. What Mao had in mind boiled down to a deal: Chinese soldiers would fight the Americans for Stalin in exchange for Soviet technology and equipment.
Stalin received reports from both his ambassador in Korea and his liaison with Mao about Mao's eagerness to have a war in Korea. As a result of this new factor, Stalin began to reconsider his previous refusal to let Kim invade the South.
Stalin was given a push by Kim.On 19 January 1950, the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang, Terentii Shtykov, reported Kim had told him, "excitedly" that "now that China is completing its liberation," South Korea's was "next in line." Kim "thinks that he needs to visit comrade Stalin again, in order to receive instruction and authorization to launch an offensive." Kim added that "if it was not possible to meet comrade Stalin now, he will try to meet with Mao." He stressed that Mao had "promised to render him assistance after the conclusion of the war in China." Playing "the Mao card," Kim told Shtykov that "he also has other questions for Mao Tse-tung, in particular the question of the possibility of setting up an Eastern bureau of the Cominform" (no mention of talking to Stalin about this). Mao, he said "would have instructions on all issues." Kim was telling Stalin that Mao was keen to give him military support, and that if Stalin would still not endorse an invasion, he (Kim) would go to Mao direct and place himself under Mao.
Eleven days later, on 30 January, Stalin wired Shtykov to tell Kim that he was "prepared to help him on this." This is the first documented evidence of Stalin agreeing to start a war in Korea, and he shifted his position because of Mao, who possessed the critical asset - an inexhaustible supply of men. When Kim came to Moscow two months later, Stalin said that the international environment had "changed sufficiently to permit a more active stance on the unification of Korea." He went on to make it explicit that this was because "the Chinese were now in a position to devote more attention to the Korean issue." There was "one vital condition - Peking's support" for the war. Kim "must rely on Mao, who understands Asian affairs beautifully."
A war in Korea fought by Chinese and Koreans would give the Soviet Union incalculable advantages: it could field-test both its own new equipment, especially its MiG jets, and America's technology, as well as acquiring some of this technology, along with valuable intelligence on America. Both China and Korea would be completely dependent on Russian arms, so Stalin could fine-tune the degree of Russia's involvement. Moreover, he could test how far America would go in a war with the Communist camp.
But for Stalin, the greatest attraction of a war in Korea was that the Chinese, with their massive numbers, which Mao was eager to use, might be able to eliminate, and in any case tie down, so many American troops that the balance of power might tilt in Stalin's favor and enable him to turn his schemes into reality. These schemes included seizing various European countries, among them Germany, Spain and Italy. One scenario Stalin discussed during the Korean War was an air attack on the US fleet on the high seas between Japan and Korea (en route to Inchon, in September 1950). In fact, Stalin told Mao o 5 October 1950 that the period provided a unique - and short-lived - window of opportunity because two of the major capitalist states, Germany and Japan, were out of action militarily. Discussing the possibility of what amounted to a Third World War, Stalin said: "Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should not ... If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years' time..."
Mao repeatedly spelled out this potential to Stalin, as a way of stressing his usefulness. On 1 July 1950, within a week of the North invading the South, and long before Chinese troops had gone in, he had Chou tell the Russian ambassador: "Now we must energetically build up our aviation and fleet," adding pointedly for Stalin's ears: so as to deal a knockout blow... to the armed forces of the USA." On 19 August Mao himself told Stalin's emissary, Yudin, that America could send in thirty to forty divisions but that Chinese troops could "grind" these up. He reiterated this message to Yudin a week later. Then, on 1 March 1951, he summed up his overall plan for the Korean War to Stalin in chilling language: "to spend several years consuming several hundred thousand American lives."
With Mao's expendables on offer, Stalin positively disired a war with the West in Korea. When Kim invaded the South on 25 June 1950, the UN Security Council quickly passed a resolution committing troops to support South Korea. Stalin's ambassador to the UN, Yakov Malik, had been boycotting proceedings since January, ostensibly over Taiwan continuing to occupy China's seat. Everyone expected Malik, who remained in New York, to return to the chamber and veto the resolution, but he stayed away. Malik had in fact requested permission to return to the Security Council, but Stalin rang him up and told him to stay out. The Soviet failure to exercise its veto power has perplexed observers ever since, as it seemed a golden opportunity to block the West's involvement in Korea. But if Stalin decided not to use his veto, it can only have been for one reason: that he did not want to keep Western forces out. He wanted them in,where Mao's sheer weight of numbers could grind them up.

... Because of the enormous ramifications of taking on the USA, Stalin decided to keep an extra degree of control. He had to make absolutely sure that Kim understood that he, Stalin, was the ultimate boss before he put Kim in Mao's hands. So even thoughMao was in Moscow on 30 January, when Stalin gave Kim consent to go to war, he did not breathe a word to Mao, and ordered Kim not to inform the Chinese. Stalin brought Kim to Moscow only at the end of March, after Mao had left. Stalin went over battle plans in detail with Kim, and at theirr last talk, in April 1950, he laid it on the line to Kim: "If you should get kicked in the teeth, I shall not lift a finger. You have to ask Mao for help." With this comradely envoi, Kim was waved away to Mao's care.
On 13 May a Russian plane flew Kim to Peking. He went straight to Mao to announce that Stalin had given the go-ahead. At 11:30 that night, Chou was dispatched to ask the Soviet ambassador, Roshchin, to get Moscow's conformation. Stalin's stilted message came the next morning: "North Korea can move toward actions; however, this question should be discussed... personally with comrade Mao." Next day (15 May), Mao gave Kim his full commitment, and on the most vital issue: "if the Americans were to take part... [China] would assist North Korea with its own troops." He went out of his way to exclude the participation od Russian troops, saying that: "Since the Soviet Union is bound by a demarcation agreement on the 38th Parallel [dividing Korea] with America, it would be 'inconvenient' [for it] to take part in military actions [but as] China is not bound by any such obligations, it can therefore fully render assistance to the northerners." Mao offered to deploy troops on the Korean border.
Mao endorsed the Kim-Stalin plan, and Stalin wired consent on the 16th. On 25 June the North Korean army smashed across the 38th Parallel. Mao, it seems, was not told the launch day. Kim wanted Chinese troops kept out until they were absolutely needed. Stalin, too, wanted them in only when America committed large numbers of troops for the Chinese to "consume."